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Abstract
This thesis considers three topics in stochastic control theory. Each of these topics is moti-
vated by an application in finance. In each of the stochastic control problems formulated,
the optimal strategy is characterised using dynamic programming. Closed form solutions
are derived in a number of special cases.
The first topic is about the market making problem in which a market maker manages
his risk from inventory holdings of a certain asset. The magnitude of this inventory is
stochastic with changes occurring due to client trading activity, and can be controlled by
making small adjustments to the so-called skew, namely, the quoted price offered to the
clients. After formulating the stochastic control problem, closed form solutions are derived
for the special cases that arise if the asset price is modelled by a Brownian motion with
drift or a geometric Brownian motion. In both cases the impact of skew is additive. The
optimal controls are time dependent affine functions of the inventory size and the inventory
process under the optimal skew is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. As a result, the asset
price is mean reverting around a reference rate.
In the second topic the same framework is expanded to include a hedging control that
can be used by the market maker to manage the inventory. In particular, the market
impact is assumed to be of the Almgren and Chriss type. Explicit solutions are derived in
the special case where the asset price follows a Brownian motion with drift.
The third topic is about Merton’s portfolio optimisation problem with the additional
feature that the risky asset price is modelled in a way that exhibits support and resistance
levels. In particular, the risky asset price is modelled using a skew Brownian motion. After
formulating the stochastic control problem, closed form solutions are derived.
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Introduction
Algorithmic trading refers to any trading system in which the decision making process is
free from human intervention. The use of the phrase algorithmic indicates that actions are
initiated by a piece of logic that listens to market data, news feeds, or any other source
of information that can be expressed electronically. Although it is often confused with
one of its more glamorous subsets, namely high frequency arbitrage, algorithmic trading
encompasses almost every aspect of the trading of financial assets. Indeed, it is part of a
much broader secular trend towards automation, driven by technological advances.
Algorithmic trading has become the main way in which assets are exchanged in financial
markets. Estimates vary, but in some markets algorithmic or electronic traders are respon-
sible for more than 90% of traded volume, see for example a 2014 report by the SEC [US
14]. The approach to trading used by algorithmic traders is usually quite different from
that of manual traders. Consequently, we should consider models that take these differences
into account.
In this thesis, we consider three topics in stochastic control theory. Each of these topics
is motivated by an application in algorithmic trading. In each of the stochastic control
problems formulated, we characterise the optimal strategy using dynamic programming.
We then derive closed form solutions in a number of special cases.
The first topic is about the market making problem in which a market maker manages
his risk from inventory holdings of a certain asset. The magnitude of this inventory is
stochastic with changes occurring due to client trading activity, and can be controlled by
making small adjustments to the so-called skew, namely, the quoted price offered to the
clients. After formulating the stochastic control problem, we derive closed form solutions
for the special cases that arise if the asset price is modelled by a Brownian motion with
drift or a geometric Brownian motion. In both cases the impact of skew is additive. The
optimal controls are time dependent affine functions of the inventory size and the inventory
process under the optimal skew is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. As a result, the asset
price is mean reverting around a reference rate.
In the second topic the same framework is expanded to include a hedging control that
can be used by the market maker to manage the inventory. In particular, the market impact
is assumed to be of the Almgren and Chriss type. We then derive explicit solutions in the
special case where the asset price follows a Brownian motion with drift.
The third topic is about Merton’s portfolio optimisation problem with the additional
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feature that the risky asset price is modelled in a way that exhibits support and resistance
levels. In particular, the risky asset price is modelled using a skew Brownian motion. After
formulating the stochastic control problem, closed form solutions are derived.
I Market Making
In Chapter 1 we consider the problem of a market maker, that is, a market participant who
provides continuously tradable prices to a set of clients. Market makers are the facilitators
of market liquidity, performing a role that is needed to smooth the time inconsistencies that
naturally occur in markets. These time inconsistencies appear in financial markets since it
is unlikely that when one investor wishes to sell, another simultaneously wishes to buy. The
purpose of market making can therefore be seen as the smoothing through time of levels of
supply and demand in markets, thereby creating continuously available liquidity.
Our study casts the market maker as the main protagonist in this interaction. However,
the clients with which the market maker trades also play an important role. In models
of financial markets, the focus is often placed on the professional investors such as banks
and hedge funds. However, the driving force and life blood of the market are those non-
professional investors who come to the market because of some fundamental and exogenous
economic requirement from which their desire to trade the asset stems. In the problem we
study, we refer to the clients of the market maker as noise traders, with that name meant to
convey the fact that we cannot directly discern the reason behind their trading. However,
we do make some basic assumptions about their price sensitivity, that is, their reaction to
being offered more or less favourable prices by the market maker.
In order to perform their role, market makers stand ready to both buy and sell assets
throughout the day, thereby accumulating holdings of the asset, also known as inventory.
They may continuously update the prices at which their clients can trade throughout the
day, and the size of their inventory changes as clients buy and sell, with the inventory
position increasing as clients sell and decreasing as clients buy. In this role, the market
maker is said to be making a market in the asset.
Of course the market maker’s motive is not simply the provision of this service to the
market. The goal of market making is no different to any other type of trading, typically,
the maximisation of revenue subject to some sort of risk constraint. Unlike traditional
portfolio theory, in which only the value of the asset is changing, the market maker faces an
additional randomness in the quantities held in his portfolio due to the trading activity of
clients. This randomness is controlled to some degree by the actions of the market maker
through adjustments to his price. Rather than simply selecting a number of units of the
asset to hold, the market maker must select a desirable level for his holdings of the asset
and aim to shift the inventory position toward it. The chosen intensity of this shift will
depend on a number of factors, such as risk tolerance and skew impact, which correspond
to implicit and explicit costs of controlling the inventory level. The cost associated with
skew is due to the need to offer more favourable prices to incentivise changes in the rate of
client buying to client selling, whereas the choice to change the inventory level more slowly
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is associated with greater inventory risk, which is itself a cost.
There is a close connection with models of market impact (with which we will enhance
our model in Chapter 2). However impact models have traditionally been motivated by a
very different type of market activity. The market impact literature focuses on the so called
optimal execution problem in which an agent seeks to execute a given quantity directly into
the market, whilst minimising market impact. The role of the financial institution in this
exchange is usually as the provider of the algorithmic execution strategy, or sometimes even
simply as the facilitator of that strategy, and in this role is said to be acting as agent. When
a financial institution provides a market making service to its clients it is said to be acting
as principal meaning that the financial institution is the principal risk taker of those clients’
trades. This interaction between client and financial institution, which might be described
as over the counter trading, should be distinguished from the more general notion of market
making, which as well as this type of interaction would encompass trading strategies that
involve leaving visible resting orders on both the bid and offer side of a limit order book
market. Although the model we present focusses on the former relationship, the insights
gained here are readily applied to any variant of market making, since they relate to the
optimisation of expected revenue and risk generated from movements in the asset price and
the inventory position. In addition most clients of over the counter market makers will
aggregate the prices of several institutions all of which provide this same service, so that
the dynamics become quite similar to on exchange market making.
Prior to the advent of algorithmic and electronic trading, the market maker’s problem
was fundamentally different. Clients would make individual requests for quotes, to which
the market maker would reply with a specific bid and offer price on which the client could,
if desired, execute a trade. In the event of a trade, the market maker’s problem was
then essentially identical to the optimal execution problem, with the aim being to rid
himself of the acquired risk. The modern market maker’s problem, that is to say the
algorithmic or electronic market maker’s problem, is quite different. Indeed, much has been
made of the way in which technological advance has improved liquidity provision, see for
example Hendershott et al. [HJM11] and Chaboud et al. [CCHV14]. What is certain is that
these changes have dramatically increased competition between market makers, thereby
compressing bid-offer spreads. This means that algorithmic market makers receive less
spread and are less able to immediately clear risk from their inventory. Consequently, the
modern market maker’s problem has become less to do with block trade pricing and the
optimal execution problem, and more to do with risk management of a portfolio, and top
of book pricing.
We choose to omit entirely any consideration of the explicit construction of bid and offer
prices. In over the counter markets this is typically done on a client by client basis, with
construction of the mid price occurring beforehand. Indeed it would be simple to append a
model that explicitly constructs the bid and offer price, such as Guilbaud and Pham [GP13],
as an extension to our framework. Moreover, the work of Glosten and Milgrom [GM85]
suggests that the formation of bid and offer prices is at least partially driven by the notion
of adverse selection. In their model, an on exchange market maker forms bid and offer
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prices at distances from the mid price that reflect where their expectation of the fair price
would be adjusted to in the event of a trade. Additionally, some unknown proportion of
traders posses private information, and so would be willing to pay an additional spread.
Our model does not include informed traders, and so in a Glosten and Milgrom setting the
market maker would set spreads to be 0. However, we do incorporate the idea of adverse
selection by including a term that captures a correlation between noise trader activity and
price movements.
We model trade arrivals as a continuous process rather than a jump process. In addition
to the discussion above, some further considerations have shaped our thinking in doing
so. The advent of electronic trading has led to small ticket sizes and higher frequency of
trading. A fairly recent survey by Menkveld [Men13] from 2010 found that in the Dutch
equity market average trade sizes are around e15,000, despite fixed transaction fees of over
e1, and in the super liquid foreign exchange market it is not unusual for trades of lower
than $1,000 notional value to occur. The skew process then acts more like a lever changing
the direction of aggregate client flow, whereas in the context of Poisson arrivals, the skew
would change the probability of the direction of the next jump in inventory.
On the basis of these considerations, we focus our attention on the core component of
the market maker’s problem which is the management of inventory risk by skewing a mid
price, expressed as an appropriate offset from a market reference price. We will model
noise trader activity using a controlled diffusion process, and we feel that this is a sensible
approximation.
Much of the research under the title of market making is focussed exclusively on one
specific type, namely on exchange market making, which as discussed is only a subset of
the general concept. Bayraktar and Ludkovski [BL14] consider the slow execution of a
block order using limit orders, with a focus on controlling the intensity of trade arrivals by
adjusting the placement of orders in a limit order book. Avellaneda and Stoikov [AS08]
consider an on exchange market maker in a similar setting with Poisson trade arrival in-
tensities and compute some numerical results. The focus of both of these models is the
area of market market microstructure of the limit order book. Closer to the topic of this
chapter is Carmona and Webster [CW12] who consider an interesting special case of the
over the counter market making problem in which a high frequency market maker attempts
to utilise information present in client trades to his own advantage. Gueant et al. [GLFT13]
consider the problem of inventory risk for a market maker faced with Poisson arrivals, and
investigate the asymptotic properties of the resulting bid and offer prices. Guilbard and
Pham [GP13] present a model which focuses on the order placement of an on exchange
market maker, who submits limit orders around a top of book price that evolves according
to a Markov chain with finite values. They also consider the inventory risk associated with
holdings and use a mean-quadratic risk criterion which is the same as the one considered
in this chapter.
The model we present in Chapter 1 considers the solution to the market makers problem
in continuous time with an inventory process that evolves according to a controlled diffusion
process. We formulate the model in such a way as to allow for price dynamics that follow
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another diffusion process and allow the market maker’s price to be a general function of
the unaffected asset price and the skew control. We present closed form solutions in two
special cases. By allowing for drift in the unaffected asset price, and correlation between
the asset price and noise trader activity we allow for the study of two interesting features
of the market makers problem, namely the utilisation of private information on the asset
price and the adverse selection effect caused by client toxicity.
In Section 2 of the chapter, we present the formal stochastic control problem on both
the finite and infinite time horizons, for which we will prove separate verification theorems
in Section 3 of the chapter. Using these theorems, in Section 4 of the chapter we present two
special cases for which we can find closed form expressions for the value function and the
skew control. The first of these special cases models the asset price as a Bachelier process,
whereas the second case uses geometric Brownian motion.
II Hedging and Market Impact
In Chapter 2, we further develop the model considered in Chaper 1. We study a market in
which a market maker provides liquidity to a set of clients by setting a tradable price as
an offset from a known reference price. The market maker’s primary objective is to make
money from the flow of client trades, or as we have been referring to them, noise traders.
The market maker is sensitive to the amount of risk he is holding at any given time and so,
as covered in Chapter 1, will try and skew his price to avoid build-ups of risk. This comes
at a small cost in revenue as skewing the price to incentivise this risk reducing behaviour
means lowering the price at which he will sell or raising the price at which he will buy.
We expand the setting in which the market maker operates to include an additional
market, which we will refer to as the interbank market. If skewing is insufficient to reduce
the market maker’s risk he may choose to hedge this risk in the interbank market, that is,
lay it off with other market makers or professional trading firms and pay a transaction fee
to do so.
To this end we model a two tiered marketplace in which noise traders interact only with
the market maker, whereas the market maker has access to a second pool of liquidity namely
the interbank market. The interbank market is the forum in which large professional trading
firms trade with each other. We might also refer to this market as the primary market in the
sense that it represents the location where price formation occurs and where the majority
of information that market makers use to set prices resides.
To justify this structure it is important to discuss the reasons why noise traders do
not also possess access to the interbank market. To do so requires us to emphasise the
difference between the noise traders, who represent the clients of the market maker, and
professional investors such as our market maker. Typically the market making function
is performed by a trading desk in an investment bank or hedge fund that specialises in
electronic execution and risk management, with a client base that consists of a varied mix
of smaller investors, including but not limited to the trading departments of non-financial
corporations, non-execution focused hedge funds and asset managers, and smaller banks.
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These investors may themselves be financial professionals, but if so they are typically not
focused on execution. By this we mean that they do not have the inclination to manage the
execution of their deals themselves, and do not wish to make the fixed investments in fees
and technology infrastructure needed to trade in the primary market. Equally they may
simply lack the scale and resources to make such an investment in execution infrastructure.
Further to these considerations, some markets specify a minimum trade size which may
make trading in the interbank market prohibitive for some market participants. On the
other hand, trading with a bank allows for greater flexibility, including the possibility to
trade in smaller sizes. Furthermore, in general the market maker is compelled by the
competitive nature of markets to offer clients prices that are better than those available in
the interbank market. The definition of a better price may be quite illusive, but roughly
speaking we may assume that it means a smaller bid-offer spread. For this reason the
noise traders may simply opt not to trade in the interbank market, even if such access were
available to them.
Prices shown by the market maker are generally free of arbitrage in the sense that they
are not crossed with the primary market. By this we mean that the market maker’s bid
price is never higher than the primary market offer price or his offer price is lower than
the primary market bid. The two tiered nature of the market would mean this could not
be considered pure arbitrage, but in practice such soft arbitrage will be spotted and the
opportunity to profit seized upon by a client who possesses access to the liquidity provided
by two market makers and can therefore trade in opposite directions with each of them.
Within our model, we wish the representation of the interbank market to capture both
the random arrival of new information expressed through changes in the expected fair
value of the underlying asset, as well as price changes caused by the depletion of liquidity,
that is, through market impact caused by the market participants. These two notions are
clearly intertwined, in some cases the act of trading is itself a signal, sending information
to other market participants, who update their expectations of the fair value of the asset
accordingly, see for example Glosten and Milgrom [GM85]. However for the purposes of
modelling market impact, we will assume that these notions are separable and there exists
a known market impact function, as well as a source of exogenous information which drives
changes in the asset price in the absence of trades.
In addition, price movements in the interbank market might also be due to the actions
of competing market makers, but as this information is private to those market makers,
and as we do not attempt here to model the game theoretic nature of interaction in the
interbank market, we assume that all impact other than that caused by our market maker is
contained in a Brownian motion term. This is quite reasonable in that it allows our market
maker to concentrate on his own market impact.
There is a rich literature relating to market impact models beginning with the foun-
dational work of Bertsimas and Lo [BL98] and Almgren and Chriss [AC99, AC01, Alm03]
in which they formulate the problem of how to optimally split the execution of an order
into smaller pieces, with the objective being minimise some cost function over a set time
horizon. This has come to be known as the optimal execution problem and we discuss it in
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more detail in Section 1.1 of Chapter 2. This model has been extended by many authors.
Notably Gatheral and Schied [GS11] consider the problem with a GBM price process and a
time-averaged VaR risk criteria and Forsyth [For11] considers a mean-variance type model
in a continuous time setting. In contrast to much of the early research into the optimal ex-
ecution problem, which focussed on static or deterministic trading strategies, Almgren and
Lorenz [LA11] develop a model to produce adaptive trading strategies. They do so within
the framework of the original Almgren Chriss model, as do Schied and Scho¨neborn [SS09] for
an investor with von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences on an infinite time horizon. Alfonsi
et al. [AFS10] introduce an interesting alternative to the Almgren Chriss model in which
rather than separate temporary and permanent impact they include a single temporary but
persistant impact term. Further advances to the model have incorporated singular control
so as to allow for block trades. For example Guo and Zervos [GZ15] develop a model of
multiplicative impact and solve the optimal execution problem in this context.
To the best of our knowledge the model that we study is the first one that considers
market impact from the perspective of a market maker whose revenue depends on minimis-
ing his own market impact when hedging positions. We model the fair value of the asset
as a diffusion process subject to permanent market impact. The market maker’s inven-
tory process is modelled as another controlled diffusion, where both the skew and hedging
controls alter the drift of the process. Our market maker will seek to to maximise a mean-
quadratic performance criterion, of the same type as the one discussed in Chapter 1. We
present closed form solutions in a special case where the asset price is a Bachelier process
with linear permanent and temporary market impact of the Almgren and Chriss type.
In Section 2 of the chapter, we present the formal stochastic control problem on both
the finite and infinite time horizons, for which we prove separate verification theorems in
Section 3 of the chapter. Using these theorems, in Section 4 of the chapter we present the
special case for which we can find closed form expressions for the value function and both
the skew control and the hedging control.
III Support and Resistance
In Chapter 3 we consider the optimisation problem faced by a single agent who possesses
wealth consisting of an initial endowment x which may be consumed or invested over an
interval [0, T ]. Consuming wealth too quickly will reduce the amount of capital available
to grow via investment, whereas investment is inherently risky and is not guaranteed to
result in greater wealth being available for future consumption. The agent is therefore
faced with the challenge of how to set these controls in order to maximise his total utility
from both consumption and investment. The study of this type of problem is known as
portfolio optimisation theory and has a long history. At the origin of the area is the work of
Merton [Mer69], who, building on earlier insights made by Markowitz [Mar52], considered
stochastic dynamics for the traded assets in continuous time and power utility functions.
The model that we study in this chapter falls within the context of the Merton model.
However we introduce asset prices that include singularities in their drift. The purpose of
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this is to represent support and resistance levels. Specifically of interest is how the agent
should respond to optimally adjust his holdings of the asset and rate of consumption when
such levels are present in the market. A standard definition of support and resistance levels
is given by Murphy [Mur99]:
“Support is a level or area on the chart under the market where buying interest
is sufficiently strong to overcome selling pressure. As a result, a decline is halted
and prices turn back again . . . Resistance is the opposite of support.”
Such price points exist in markets for a variety of reasons, one key reason being the
presence of clustered resting orders in the market. Resting orders are instructions left with
a financial institution to execute an order for a client only when the price arrives at a pre-
specified level. For a buy order, if this rate is lower than the prevailing rate then the order
is a take profit, whereas if it is higher than the prevailing rate the order is a stop loss. Such
orders are the standard way in which to open a new position or close an existing position
at a certain price, especially for systematic strategies such as trend following strategies. In
an empirical analysis of such orders in the FX market, Osler [Osl01] noted two interesting
phenomena whilst investigating why trading strategies that depend on price level breakouts
are persistently profitable. Firstly, there are significant differences in the clustering patterns
of stop loss orders compared to take profit orders. Stop loss orders tended to spread more
than take profit order, which cluster strongly. Second, the clustering locations of take profit
orders were strongly linked to round numbers in the asset price, while stop loss orders tended
to be clustered just above round numbers for buy stops, and just below round numbers for
sell stops.
These two observations provide important motivation for our model. The empirical
existence of support and resistance levels provides a general justification for the model we
study. The observation that their origin is in clustered resting orders also suggest that a
good model for support and resistance would involve impulses in the price dynamics, rather
than an alternative such as a price dependent drift function, since the underlying source of
the phenomenon is itself a cluster of single impulses, namely resting orders.
Stochastic processes that exhibit precisely this behaviour are well known. Diffusions
with generalised drift, such as those considered in Lejay [Lej06], are a generalisation of
the skew Brownian motion the properties of which have been studied by Walsh [Wal78],
Harrison and Shepp [HS81], and Engelbert and Schmidt [ES85], among others. The skew
Brownian motion behaves like a Brownian motion away from a given level, but once it hits
that level the side of the level on which it makes its next excursion depends on the outcome
of an independent Bernoulli random variable. It can be shown that the skew Brownian
motion is the strong solution to a SDE involving its local time at the level in question.
In Section 2 of the chapter we present the formal stochastic control problem on both the
finite and infinite time horizons, for which we will prove separate verification theorems in
Section 3. Using these theorems, in Section 4 and 5 of the chapter we present closed form




This chapter concerns the problem of a market maker, that is, a market participant who
provides continuously tradable prices to a set of clients. Market makers are the facilitators
of market liquidity, performing a role that is needed to smooth the time inconsistencies that
naturally occur in markets. These time inconsistencies appear in financial markets since it
is unlikely that when one investor wishes to sell, another simultaneously wishes to buy. The
purpose of market making can therefore be seen as the smoothing through time of levels of
supply and demand in markets, thereby creating continuously available liquidity.
Our study casts the market maker as the main protagonist in this interaction. However,
the clients with which the market maker trades also play an important role. In models
of financial markets, the focus is often placed on the professional investors such as banks
and hedge funds. However, the driving force and life blood of the market are those non-
professional investors who come to the market because of some fundamental and exogenous
economic requirement from which their desire to trade the asset stems. In the problem we
study, we refer to the clients of the market maker as noise traders, with that name meant to
convey the fact that we cannot directly discern the reason behind their trading. However,
we do make some basic assumptions about their price sensitivity, that is, their reaction to
being offered more or less favourable prices by the market maker.
In order to perform their role, market makers stand ready to both buy and sell assets
throughout the day, thereby accumulating holdings of the asset, also known as inventory.
They may continuously update the prices at which their clients can trade throughout the
day, and the size of their inventory changes as clients buy and sell, with the inventory
position increasing as clients sell and decreasing as clients buy. In this role, the market
maker is said to be making a market in the asset.
Of course the market maker’s motive is not simply the provision of this service to the
market. The goal of market making is no different to any other type of trading, typically,
the maximisation of revenue subject to some sort of risk constraint. Unlike traditional
portfolio theory, in which only the value of the asset is changing, the market maker faces an
11
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additional randomness in the quantities held in his portfolio due to the trading activity of
clients. This randomness is controlled to some degree by the actions of the market maker
through adjustments to his price. Rather than simply selecting a number of units of the
asset to hold, the market maker must select a desirable level for his holdings of the asset
and aim to shift the inventory position toward it. The chosen intensity of this shift will
depend on a number of factors, such as risk tolerance and skew impact, which correspond
to implicit and explicit costs of controlling the inventory level. The cost associated with
skew is due to the need to offer more favourable prices to incentivise changes in the rate of
client buying to client selling, whereas the choice to change the inventory level more slowly
is associated with greater inventory risk, which is itself a cost.
There is a close connection with models of market impact (with which we will enhance
our model in Chapter 2). However impact models have traditionally been motivated by a
very different type of market activity. The market impact literature focuses on the so called
optimal execution problem in which an agent seeks to execute a given quantity directly into
the market, whilst minimising market impact. The role of the financial institution in this
exchange is usually as the provider of the algorithmic execution strategy, or sometimes even
simply as the facilitator of that strategy, and in this role is said to be acting as agent. When
a financial institution provides a market making service to its clients it is said to be acting
as principal meaning that the financial institution is the principal risk taker of those clients’
trades. This interaction between client and financial institution, which might be described
as over the counter trading, should be distinguished from the more general notion of market
making, which as well as this type of interaction would encompass trading strategies that
involve leaving visible resting orders on both the bid and offer side of a limit order book
market. Although the model we present focusses on the former relationship, the insights
gained here are readily applied to any variant of market making, since they relate to the
optimisation of expected revenue and risk generated from movements in the asset price and
the inventory position. In addition most clients of over the counter market makers will
aggregate the prices of several institutions all of which provide this same service, so that
the dynamics become quite similar to on exchange market making.
Prior to the advent of algorithmic and electronic trading, the market maker’s problem
was fundamentally different. Clients would make individual requests for quotes, to which
the market maker would reply with a specific bid and offer price on which the client could,
if desired, execute a trade. In the event of a trade, the market maker’s problem was
then essentially identical to the optimal execution problem, with the aim being to rid
himself of the acquired risk. The modern market maker’s problem, that is to say the
algorithmic or electronic market maker’s problem, is quite different. Indeed, much has been
made of the way in which technological advance has improved liquidity provision, see for
example Hendershott et al. [HJM11] and Chaboud et al. [CCHV14]. What is certain is that
these changes have dramatically increased competition between market makers, thereby
compressing bid-offer spreads. This means that algorithmic market makers receive less
spread and are less able to immediately clear risk from their inventory. Consequently, the
modern market maker’s problem has become less to do with block trade pricing and the
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optimal execution problem, and more to do with risk management of a portfolio, and top
of book pricing.
We choose to omit entirely any consideration of the explicit construction of bid and offer
prices. In over the counter markets this is typically done on a client by client basis, with
construction of the mid price occurring beforehand. Indeed it would be simple to append a
model that explicitly constructs the bid and offer price, such as Guilbaud and Pham [GP13],
as an extension to our framework. Moreover, the work of Glosten and Milgrom [GM85]
suggests that the formation of bid and offer prices is at least partially driven by the notion
of adverse selection. In their model, an on exchange market maker forms bid and offer
prices at distances from the mid price that reflect where their expectation of the fair price
would be adjusted to in the event of a trade. Additionally, some unknown proportion of
traders posses private information, and so would be willing to pay an additional spread.
Our model does not include informed traders, and so in a Glosten and Milgrom setting the
market maker would set spreads to be 0. However, we do incorporate the idea of adverse
selection by including a term that captures a correlation between noise trader activity and
price movements.
We model trade arrivals as a continuous process rather than a jump process. In addition
to the discussion above, some further considerations have shaped our thinking in doing
so. The advent of electronic trading has led to small ticket sizes and higher frequency of
trading. A fairly recent survey by Menkveld [Men13] from 2010 found that in the Dutch
equity market average trade sizes are around e15,000, despite fixed transaction fees of over
e1, and in the super liquid foreign exchange market it is not unusual for trades of lower
than $1,000 notional value to occur. The skew process then acts more like a lever changing
the direction of aggregate client flow, whereas in the context of Poisson arrivals, the skew
would change the probability of the direction of the next jump in inventory.
On the basis of these considerations, we focus our attention on the core component of
the market maker’s problem which is the management of inventory risk by skewing a mid
price, expressed as an appropriate offset from a market reference price. We will model
noise trader activity using a controlled diffusion process, and we feel that this is a sensible
approximation.
Much of the research under the title of market making is focussed exclusively on one
specific type, namely on exchange market making, which as discussed is only a subset of
the general concept. Bayraktar and Ludkovski [BL14] consider the slow execution of a
block order using limit orders, with a focus on controlling the intensity of trade arrivals by
adjusting the placement of orders in a limit order book. Avellaneda and Stoikov [AS08]
consider an on exchange market maker in a similar setting with Poisson trade arrival in-
tensities and compute some numerical results. The focus of both of these models is the
area of market market microstructure of the limit order book. Closer to the topic of this
chapter is Carmona and Webster [CW12] who consider an interesting special case of the
over the counter market making problem in which a high frequency market maker attempts
to utilise information present in client trades to his own advantage. Gueant et al. [GLFT13]
consider the problem of inventory risk for a market maker faced with Poisson arrivals, and
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investigate the asymptotic properties of the resulting bid and offer prices. Guilbard and
Pham [GP13] present a model which focuses on the order placement of an on exchange
market maker, who submits limit orders around a top of book price that evolves according
to a Markov chain with finite values. They also consider the inventory risk associated with
holdings and use a mean-quadratic risk criterion which is the same as the one considered
in this chapter.
The model we present in this chapter considers the solution to the market makers
problem in continuous time with an inventory process that evolves according to a controlled
diffusion process. We formulate the model in such a way as to allow for price dynamics that
follow another diffusion process and allow the market maker’s price to be a general function
the unaffected asset price and the skew control. We present closed form solutions in two
special cases. By allowing for drift in the unaffected asset price, and correlation between
the asset price and noise trader activity we allow for the study of two interesting features
of the market makers problem, namely the utilisation of private information on the asset
price and the adverse selection effect caused by client toxicity.
In the remainder of this section we describe, in greater detail, some concepts that are
central to the model. The purpose of this is to motivate the market maker’s objective
function which will take the form of a risk adjusted revenue function. Specifically, the
market maker’s revenue will be adjusted by a mean-quadratic risk criterion that penalises
variations in the inventory position. In Section 2 we present the formal stochastic control
problem on both the finite and infinite time horizons, for which we will prove separate
verification theorems in Section 3. Using these theorems, in Section 4 we present two
special cases for which we can find closed form expressions for the value function and the
skew control. The first of these models the asset price as a Bachelier process, whereas the
second case uses geometric Brownian motion.
1.1 The Market Reference Price Process
We assume that there exists an underlying reference rate for the asset, which is publicly
known but not tradable. The purpose of this reference rate in our model is to allow noise
traders something against which to assess the relative attractiveness of the market maker’s
price. Often such a reference is understood to be a consensus value given all public infor-
mation, as in Glosten and Milgrom [GM85]. In practice there are many possible sources for
reference rates in real markets, although the specific nature may differ somewhat in different
markets. For example, in a liquid markets there is often a way for market participants to
view a reference price electronically in close to real time, although truly real time access to
such a rate may have an associated cost. Typically, publicly visible reference rates will be
composed of aggregated prices from a wide variety of sources. Markets in which no such
benchmark exists would necessarily demand a deep and one directional trust on the part
of the client towards the market maker, and if they exist, such markets would not exhibit
the dynamics which we wish to model here. This rate is referred to as the unaffected price
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process and is modelled by
dSt = µ(St)dt+ σ(St)dWt
for some functions µ(.) and σ(.), where W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion.
It is assumed that this reference rate process is exogenously generated in the sense
that the market makers control does not factor into the reference price. The use of an
unaffected price process is standard in the optimal execution literature. Bertsimas and
Lo [BL98] discuss the existence of two distinct components to price moves, one of which
is the dynamics when the asset is unaffected by trading. Almgren and Chriss [AC01] refer
to it implicitly when they discuss their equilibrium price which moves only according to
the exogenous factors of drift and volatility and the endogenous permanent impact from
trading, but distinguish it from changes in the traded price due to the temporary impact
from trading. Most subsequent models, for example Gatheral and Schied [GS11], Lorenz
and Almgren [LS13], Schied [Sch13] and Kharroubi and Pham [KP10], refer explicitly to
either a fair or an unaffected price process due to its usefulness as a way of isolating aspects
of the price move due to impact from the exogenous component.
It may appear that given the interpretation of the unaffected price process as a fair price
it makes sense for that price to be a martingale, but as has been mentioned in Lorenz and
Schied [LS13] allowing for a drift in the unaffected asset price is a good way to allow certain
interesting phenomena to be modelled. One such example is that drift may represent the
expected market impact of another major market participant. Another is that the market
maker may himself have some private information to exploit though his choice of skew.
1.2 The Market Maker’s Price Process
Investors who wish to trade the asset are permitted to buy and sell at a price set by the
market maker. Given the market maker’s skew, there is an implied price at which investors
can trade. We model this as a mid price, rather than an explicit bid and offer price. We
therefore assume noise traders buy and sell at the same price, call it S˜. The market maker
sets S˜ with reference to the unaffected price process by means of δ, which is a control
process. We refer to this process as the market maker’s control or the market maker’s skew
process.
Express the tradable asset price S˜ as a composition of the unaffected price process S
and the skew adjustment δ which the market maker applies to the unaffected price. The
general form of S˜ will be
S˜t = k(St, δt).
In general k may take any form, but we should insist that in order to maintain the intuition
and intent of the model, k should at a minimum satisfy the requirement that k is a non-
decreasing function of both δt and St, and that k(St, 0) = St.
In our special cases we will use two forms for the function k. When S is a Bachelier
process we will take
k(St, δt) = St + δt
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so that the market maker’s price is determined by an offset of δ from S. When S is geometric
Brownian motion we will take
k(St, δt) = St(1 + δt)
so that the market maker’s price is proportionally greater than S by a factor of δ.
1.3 Skew impact
As δ represents the market maker’s price relative to a public benchmark, we should expect
the flow of new trades arriving from noise traders to be monotone increasing in δ. Two key
justifications for this statement arise from the natural behaviour of noise traders. First we
note that the unaffected price should be seen as representative of fair value of the asset.
Prices that are quoted far above what is understood as a fair price will result in noise
traders delaying their decisions to submit buy trades until the price returns closer to fair
value, whilst also hurrying their decisions to submit sell trades. Secondly, as market makers
price in competition with each other, noise traders are able to route their trading activity
to the most attractive price available to them. Consequently when the market maker skews
the price up he is implicitly making it more likely that his is the highest bid price across
any given set of market makers, and less likely that his is the lowest offer price. This means
that he should expect to receive more sell trades and fewer buy trades from clients and his
inventory should drift upwards.
In light of the above considerations we model the market maker’s inventory process by
dXt = ν(Xt, δt)dt+ e(Xt, δt)dBt, X0 ∈ R,
for some functions ν(.), e(.), where B is a standard Brownian motion. We model the
correlation between the noise terms involved in the asset price and the flow of trades arriving
as a constant ρ so that
d〈W,B〉t = ρdt.
Whilst the conclusions of our analysis will be valid for any choice of ν(.) and e(.) satisfying
certain technical assumptions, we informally require that they conform to our intuition as to
how the inventory process should change as the market maker changes his price. A coherent
choice for ν(.) will be both increasing in δ and ν(Xt, 0) = 0. Similarly, a coherent choice
for e(.) will be non-negative and symmetric in δ. In both of the special cases that follow we
have chosen to make ν(.) linear in δt and independent of X and e(.) constant, e.g. equation
(1.38).
1.4 Market Maker’s Revenue
Imagine a sequence of trades between the market maker and any other counterparty oc-
curring at discrete times t0, t1, . . . , tn, of size x0, x1, . . . , xn and at prices s0, s1, . . . , sn. The
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which represents the cash position of the market maker after the sequence of trades has
occurred. Note that the negative sign is due to the nature of market making: the market
maker always takes the opposite side of a counterparty’s trade, so a trade of size xi units of
the asset means that the market maker buys xi units whilst the counterparty sells xi units.
From the perspective of the market maker this means that he takes possession of xi units
of the asset and exchanges it for sixi units of cash. Therefore, after the sequence of trades




units of the asset.
Taking these summations to the limit, and remembering that we wish to model the
market maker’s net inventory holdings X which is the sum of all trades that have occurred





whilst the second summation is simply Xt −X0.
The value of Rt identifies with the market maker’s cash position, but does not equate
with any notion of trading profit, since the position Xt still needs to be cleared and the
rate at which this occurs will determine the profit generated. One option would be to take
Rt + S˜tXt. However such a modelling choice implicitly assumes that the market maker is
able and likely to clear his position at his current price. If Xt is large and the market maker’s
price is not attractive to sellers this is not realistic. Worse still by setting an arbitrarily
high price S˜t the market maker could arbitrarily increase his revenue. Instead we follow
the market convention of marking the position to market by using the unaffected price as a
reference for the fair value of the current position and taking Rt + StXt.
Thus, we propose the following form for the market maker’s revenue: it is the sum of
Rt and a mark to market term StXt. Thus, the market maker’s revenue at terminal time
T is given by
RT (δ) = −
∫ T
0
S˜tdXt + (STXT − S0X0), (1.1)
specifically, the sum of all trades marked at the rate at which they occurred, plus a mark
to market term.
As the market maker’s price S˜ is a deterministic function of S, X and δ we can express
revenue using the dynamics of X as






k(St, δt)e(Xt, δt)dBt + (STXT − S0X0). (1.2)
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An application of Itoˆ’s product formula allows us to calculate
STXT − S0X0 =
∫ T
0






















This expression provides an alternative way to understand the source of revenue for the
market maker. The drift term includes ν(Xt, δt) (St − k(St, δt)) which should be understood
as the expected cost due to the decision of the market maker to skew the price. Since we
have informally stated that sensible choices for ν(Xt, δt) and k(St, δt) are increasing in δ
this means that this term is equal to zero only when k(St, δt) = St. This in turn suggests
that when the market maker shows a skewed price the net change in inventory should arrive
with a negative inception cost.
The term µ(St)Xt has the obvious intuition that the market maker benefits by holding
positions on the right side of the market drift, while the final term ρσ(St)e(Xt, δt) has the
equally obvious interpretation that if changes in inventory are positively correlated with
market moves this acts in the interests of the market maker, and vice versa.
1.5 Risk and inventory costs
A risk neutral market maker would simply maximise the expected value of the revenue
function RT (δ) described in the previous section. However in reality market makers are
not risk neutral and so we wish to include a risk related component in the market maker’s
objective function. Such costs may arise due to self imposed restrictions such as a fee
charged by the banks central risk desk, external sources such as the costs associated with
holding open positions on a futures exchange or simply an inherent risk aversion.
It would appear desirable to include a term penalising the variance of terminal revenue,
which suggests the objective function
E [RT (δ)]− λVar [RT (δ)]
where the parameter λ defines the risk aversion of the market maker. However there are
inherent problems with introducing a variance term explicitly in a continuous time optimal
control problem. This problem is known as time-inconsistency and is explored in [BM10,
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BMZ14, ZL00, BC10]. The source of the problem is the E [RT (δ)]2 term appearing in the
variance term.
We restrict ourself to time consistent measures of risk rather than the variance of ter-
minal revenue. One such option first suggested in Brugiere [Bru96] is to use the quadratic
variation of revenue. Not only is this measure time consistent but it is also intuitively ap-
pealing since it penalises large deviations in revenue throughout the entire trading period.






This risk criterion, known as the time-averaged VaR process, has been widely adopted
in the optimal execution literature, for example Lorenz and Schied [LS13], Schied [Sch13]
and Gatheral and Schied [GS11], due to its time consistent nature, intuitive appeal and
popularity with practitioners. In our setting this is not directly applicable as the inventory
process of the market maker X can be negative which would result in negative risk accruing
to negative inventory holdings. We would need to replace Xt, e.g., with |Xt|. However the
resulting non-linearity would complicate our analysis.
Partially to address this issue, a common approach in the market making literature,
e.g. Guilbaud and Pham [GP13], is to use a mean-quadratic risk criteria meaning that the

























ρe(Xt, δt)(St − k(St, δt))σ(St)Xtdt (1.5)
where the first integral represents the temporary variation in revenue caused by values of
δ away from 0, the second integral represents the variation in revenue caused by the pure
market risk due to price fluctuations, and the third integral represents cross correlation of
the previous two effects. We then see that the penalisation term used in mean-quadratic
risk criteria corresponds to the component of the quadratic variation of revenue that is due
to market risk.
Additionally, we wish to include a terminal time cost function to represent both the
cost of clearing or the cost of holding risk overnight. Market making desks can typically
hold an overnight position after the end of the trading session but need to pay a fee to fund
this position. Overnight risk can be seen as a single random variable, since the inventory
process XT is fixed until the next days open, and the asset price ST will exhibit a sudden
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jump on the open. Consequently, market making desks are often heavily incentivised to
clear their positions at the end of the trading period to avoid these risks during the market
close. In the marker making literature it is common to either include such a penalty term
or enforce strategies that result in XT = 0, see for example Guilbaud and Pham [GP13],
thereby avoiding the need for such a penalty. We choose to include a penalty for the terminal




We therefore include two additional functions in the market maker’s objective function
which we denote by Φ(.) and Ψ(.) which represent these factors. Motivated by the con-
siderations made above we will allow these functions to take general forms, however in the
examples they will take the restricted forms
Ψ(s, x) = kx2 and Φ(s, x) = Kx2
in the Bachelier case and
Ψ(s, x) = ksx2 and Φ(s, x) = Ksx2
in the GBM case to correspond to (1.4) and (1.6). The market maker’s objective function






Ψ(St, Xt)dt− Φ(ST , XT )
]
.
Remark 1. We also note that linear-quadratic type objective functions similar in nature
to those motivated in this chapter can be derived from the family of exponential utility
functions
u(x) = −e−ax ≈ −1 + ax− 1
2
a2x2
for small a, where a represents risk aversion.
2 The Market Model and Control Problem
Fix a probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) supporting two standard one-dimensional (Ft)-Brownian
motions W and B. Suppose W and B are correlated with coefficient ρ, namely,
d〈W,B〉t = ρdt.
The system we study comprises three stochastic processes S, X and δ, namely the unaffected
price process, the market maker’s inventory process and the market maker’s skew process.
The process S is given by
dSt = µ(St)dt+ σ(St)dWt, S0 = s (1.7)
CHAPTER 1. MARKET MAKING 21
and takes values in S ⊆ R, an open subset of R. The inventory process is given by
dXt = ν(Xt, δt)dt+ e(Xt, δt)dBt, X0 = x (1.8)
taking values in R. This process is affected by the skew δ, which is a D-valued process
where D ⊆ R is also open. We assume sufficient conditions to ensure the existence and
uniqueness of a strong solution to these SDEs (see Assumption 1 and Definition 1 below).
Assumption 1. The functions µ : S → R, σ : S → R, ν : R×D → R and e : R×D → R
are C1 and there exists a constant C > 0 such that
|µ(s)|+ |σ(s)| ≤ C(1 + |s|),
|µ′(s)|+ |σ′(s)|+ |νx(x, δ)|+ |ex(x, δ)| ≤ C,
and
|ν(x, δ)|+ |e(x, δ)| ≤ C(1 + |x|+ |δ|)
for all (s, x, δ) ∈ S ×R×D. Furthermore, µ(.) and σ(.) are such that the solution to (1.7)
is non-explosive, namely, St ∈ S for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s..
2.1 The Control Problem for T <∞






(St − k(St, δt))ν(Xt, δt) + µ(St)Xt + ρe(Xt, δt)σ(St)
−Ψ(St, Xt)
]
dt− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (1.9)
over all admissible controls δ. Here e−Λ represents the subjective discounting of the market





for some measurable function β(.).
Definition 1. Given a time horizon T > 0, the set of admissible controls AT is all (Ft)-







for all m ∈ N.
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The conditions in Assumption 1 ensure that (1.7) and (1.8) have unique solutions S and
X for each choice of δ such that δ ∈ AT for all T > 0.
We define the value function of the control problem by
v(T, s, x) = sup
δ∈AT
JT,s,x(δ),
for s ∈ S and x ∈ R. Using standard stochastic control theory that can be found for
example in Pham [Pha09], we expect that the value function v of the stochastic control
problem identifies with a function w : [0, T ]× S × R→ R satisfying
wt(t, s, x) + sup
δ∈D
[
Lδw(t, s, x) + F (s, x, δ)
]
= 0 (1.11)
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S × R, and with terminal condition
w(T, s, x) = −Φ(s, x), (1.12)
where Lδ is the differential operator defined by
Lδw(t, s, x) =1
2
σ2(s)wss(t, s, x) + ρe(x, δ)σ(s)wsx(t, s, x) +
1
2
e2(x, δ)wxx(t, s, x)
+ µ(s)ws(t, s, x) + ν(x, δ)wx(t, s, x)− β(s, x)w(t, s, x) (1.13)
for δ ∈ D, and
F (s, x, δ) = (s− k(s, δ)) ν(x, δ) + µ(s)x+ ρe(x, δ)σ(s)−Ψ(s, x) (1.14)
for (s, x, δ) ∈ S × R×D.
Assumption 2. The functions F : S × R×D → R and Φ : S × R→ R are such that
|F (s, x, δ)|+ |Φ(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k + |δ|k) (1.15)
for all (s, x, δ) ∈ S × R ×D, where k ∈ N and C > 0 are constants. Also the discounting
rate β(.) takes values in R+.
2.2 The Control Problem for T =∞
Over an infinite time horizon, the market maker’s objective is to maximise the performance
criterion







(St − k(St, δt))ν(Xt, δt) + µ(St)Xt
+ ρe(Xt, δt)σ(St)−Ψ(St, Xt)
]
dt
∣∣∣S0 = s,X0 = x] (1.16)
over all admissible controls δ.
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Assumption 3. The discounting rate function β(.) is such that
β(s, x) > ε > 0
for all s ∈ S and x ∈ R, for some ε.
Definition 2. The family of all admissible controls A∞ is the set of all processes δ such





e−ΛT |Ψ(ST , XT )|
]
= 0, (1.17)
where X is the associated solution to (1.8).
Remark 2. The condition (1.17) rules out strategies that do not sufficiently control the
inventory position. Making reference to our discussion on the appropriate forms of Ψ(.) in
Section 1.5, any optimal strategy that fails to satisfy (1.17) would necessarily involve the
build up of larger and larger positions in such a way that expected future gains offset the
increasing size of the penalty term.
The value function associated with the control problem on the infinite time horizon is
defined by
v(s, x) = sup
δ∈A∞
J∞,s,x(δ)
for s ∈ S and x ∈ R. We opt to repeat the usage of v to represent the value function on
the infinite horizon, as the context will ensure there is no ambiguity.
Again, we expect that the value function v of the stochastic control problem on the




Lδw(s, x) + F (s, x, δ)
]
= 0 (1.18)
for (s, x) ∈ S × R, where Lδ is the differential operator defined by (1.13) and F is defined
by (1.14).
3 Verification Theorems
We now prove two verification theorems for the control problem described in Section 2, first
for the finite time horizon and then for the infinite horizon.
Theorem 1 (Finite Time Horizon: T <∞). Let w : [0, T ]×S×R→ R be a C1,2,2 solution
to the HJB equation (1.11)–(1.14) that satisfies the polynomial growth condition
|ws(t, s, x)|+ |wx(t, s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (1.19)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S × R for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(0, s, x) ≥ v(T, s, x) (1.20)
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for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S×R. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a measurable function
δˆ : [0, T ]× S × R→ D such that
wt(t, s, x) + Lδˆ(t,s,x)w(t, s, x) + F (s, x, δˆ(t, s, x))
= wt(t, s, x) + sup
δ∈D
[
Lδw(t, s, x) + F (s, x, δ)
]
, (1.21)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S × R. Also, suppose that the controlled diffusion
dXt = ν(Xt, δˆ(t, St, Xt))dt+ e(Xt, δˆ(t, St, Xt))dBt
where S is the solution to (1.7), admits a unique strong solution and
δˆt = δˆ(t, St, Xt)
defines a process in AT . Then δˆ is an optimal skew control and
w(0, s, x) = v(T, s, x) (1.22)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S × R.
















for all k ≥ 1. Using Itoˆ’s formula we obtain









+ ρe(Xu, δu)σ(Su)wsx(u, Su, Xu) +
1
2
e2(Xu, δu)wxx(u, Su, Xu)






σ(Su)ws(u, Su, Xu)dWu +
∫ T
0
e(Xu, δu)wx(u, Su, Xu)dBu.
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Applying the integration by parts formula we then calculate














e2(Xu, δu)wxx(u, Su, Xu)
+ µ(Su)ws(u, Su, Xu)
+ ν(Xu, δu)wx(u, Su, Xu)







e−Λtσ(St)ws(t, St, Xt)dWt +
∫ T
0
e−Λte(Xt, δt)wx(t, St, Xt)dBt.
Using Itoˆ’s isometry, Assumption 1, the growth condition on ws and wx given by (1.19),













































where k¯ ∈ N and C¯ > 0 are appropriate constants. Therefore M is a square integrable
martingale. Furthermore, Assumption 2 implies that
E
[
e−ΛT |Φ(ST , XT )|
] ≤ C (1 + E [|ST |k]+ E [|XT |k]) <∞




























Since δ may not achieve the supremum in (1.11), we have the inequality
− F (St, Xt, δt) ≥ wt(t, St, Xt) + Lδtw(t, St, Xt). (1.28)
Consequently, by substituting (1.28) and (1.12) into (1.25) and taking expectations, we
may write




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu)du
]
.




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu)du− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
]
≤ w(0, S0, X0),
which implies (1.20) because δ ∈ AT has been arbitrary.




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δˆu)du− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
]
= w(0, S0, X0).
Together with (1.20), this identity results in (1.22) as well as the optimality of δˆ.
Theorem 2 (Infinite Time Horizon: T =∞). Let w : S ×R→ R be a C2,2 solution to the
HJB equation (1.18) that satisfies the polynomial growth conditions
|w(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |Ψ(s, x)|) (1.29)
and
|ws(s, x)|+ |wx(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (1.30)
for all (s, x) ∈ S × R for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(s, x) ≥ v(s, x) (1.31)
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for all (s, x) ∈ S × R. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a measurable function δˆ :
S × R→ D such that
L¯δˆ(s,x)w(s, x) + F (s, x, δˆ(s, x)) = sup
δ∈D
[
L¯δw(s, x) + F (s, x, δ)
]
(1.32)
for all (s, x) ∈ S × R. Also suppose that the controlled diffusion
dXt = ν(Xt, δˆ(St, Xt))dt+ e(Xt, δˆt(St, Xt))dBt
admits a unique strong solution,
δˆt = δˆ(St, Xt)
defines a process in A∞. Then δˆ is an optimal skew control and
w(s, x) = v(s, x) (1.33)
for all (s, x) ∈ S × R.
Proof. Fix any admissible control δ ∈ A∞. Applying Itoˆ’s formula and the integration by
parts formula we obtain











e2(Xu, δu)wxx(Su, Xu) + µ(Su)ws(Su, Xu)











Arguing as in (1.26), we can see that M is a square integrable martingale. Furthermore,
since δ may not achieve the supremum in (1.18) we have the inequality
− F (St, Xt, δt) ≥ Lδtw(St, Xt). (1.35)
Recalling (1.27), we substitute (1.35) into (1.34) and we take expectations to obtain
E
[
e−ΛTw(ST , XT )




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu)du
]
.
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In view of Assumption 3, (1.17) in Definition 2 and (1.29), we can pass to the limit as
T →∞ through an appropriate subsequence to obtain





e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu)du
]
≤ w(S0, X0),
which implies (1.31) because δ ∈ A∞ has been arbitrary.
If we take δˆ ∈ A∞ in place of δ, then (1.35) holds with equality and





e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δˆu)du
]
= w(S0, X0).
Together with (1.31), this identity results in (1.33) as well as the optimality of δˆ.
4 Two Explicitly Solvable Special Cases
We present two alternative choices for the dynamics of S and X and the form of the market
maker’s control and incentive structure as defined by the functions k(.), Ψ(.) and Φ(.) as
well as the discounting rate β. Both choices allow for explicit solutions in both finite and
infinite time horizon.
4.1 An Explicit Solution: Bachelier Price Dynamics
In our first special case we consider Bachelier price dynamics for the fair price process and
noise trader activity that is proportional to the absolute distance of the market maker’s
price from the fair price. In particular we assume that S = D = R,
dSt = µdt+ σdWt (1.36)
and that the market maker sets his price S˜ as a linear offset from the fair price S, so that
k(St, δt) = St + δt. (1.37)
This is not a modelling assumption per se, but rather a notational convention that allows
us to express our control as an intuitive quantity. In this case the difference between the
market maker’s price and the fair price
δt = S˜t − St.
Furthermore, we assume that the skew impact is a linear function of δt that does not depend
on the current level of the fair price St. In particular, we assume that
dXt = ηδtdt+ εdBt, (1.38)
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which means that the market maker has the ability to incentivise noise trader activity at a
linear cost. This makes sense in a market with arithmetic Brownian prices, where the drift
and volatility of the fair price are independent of the actual price level St. One common
criticism of such models is the potential for the occurrence of negative prices with non-zero
probabilities. However in reality it is a reasonable modelling assumption to make in any
market where the absolute value of the asset price is large compared to the volatility and
drift, a situation that exists in almost all liquid assets. For assets for which this condition
is not met it may be preferable to consider a model involving a geometric Brownian price,
which we consider in Section 4.2.
As discussed in Section 1.5, the penalties for holding open inventory positions incurred
by the market maker can be modelled as a quadratic function of inventory holdings. We
therefore consider both time-continuous and terminal time penalties given by
Ψ(x) = kx2 and Φ(x) = Kx2. (1.39)
It is worth noting here that in our earlier discussion of the mean-quadratic risk criterion in
Section 1.5, we intended for the the constants k and K to combine both the market maker’s
risk aversion parameter λ, and the volatility of the asset price σ. We will see later in this
section that σ plays a minor role in the closed form solutions. However k and K, in which
σ is implicitly present, features prominently.
The finite horizon case T <∞





[−ηδ2t + µXt + ρεσ − kX2t ] dt−KX2T ∣∣∣X0 = x] . (1.40)
over all admissible controls AT , subject to the stochastic dynamics specified in (1.38).
The value function of the control problem identifies with some appropriate solution to
the HJB equation (1.11)–(1.13), which under the conditions described in this section is











w(T, x) = −Kx2. (1.42)





This first order condition provides some insight into the likely form of the optimal control.
The market maker’s optimal choice of skew will be to adjust his price upwards by half of
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the change in value that would occur due to any consequent change in inventory position.
This fits our intuition in the sense that the primary purpose of the skew δ is to control the
value of X, which should naturally depend on changes in the value function with respect to
X.







w2x(t, x)− kx2 + µx+ ρεσ = 0 (1.44)
with boundary condition
w(T, x) = −Kx2. (1.45)
This non-linear Cauchy problem can be solved using a series of suitable transformations.
First, we linearise the equation (1.44) using a logarithmic transformation to remove the w2x
term. In particular, we consider the expression
w(t, x) = 2
ε2
η
ln |u(τ, x)|, (1.46)
where the time reversal τ = T − t is intended to convert the terminal condition into an
initial condition. In view of the partial derivatives
























we can see that (1.44) reduces to the Cauchy problem defined by the PDE








(−kx2 + µx+ ρεσ)u(τ, x) (1.47)
and the boundary condition




Next, we introduce the transformation







































Substituting (1.49) and (1.50) back into (1.47) reduces the problem to the heat equation
u¯τ¯ (τ¯ , z) =
1
2
ε2u¯zz(τ¯ , z) (1.51)
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with initial condition













This problem has an initial condition but no boundary conditions on x, which can
occupy the entire real line. We will therefore solve it using the Fourier transform






The Fourier transform of u¯τ¯ is simply uˆτ¯ , while the second derivative term u¯zz has Fourier
transform (iξ)2uˆ. Consequently, the Fourier transformed Cauchy problem (1.51) is a first
order ODE in time




uˆ (0, ξ) = Φˆ(ξ),
where Φˆ(.) denotes the Fourier transform of the initial condition (1.52).
The solution to the transformed system is given by




To recover the solution to the original system we need only invert the transformed solution











































The inner integral can be found using Polyanin [PM08, Supplement 3.2] from which we














ε2τ¯ and b = i(z − y)
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Substituting this expression and (1.52) into (1.53) we obtain


















































We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (1.36)–(1.40).
Given a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) the value function of the control problem identifies with
the function
w(t, x) = ϕ(t)x2 + ψ(t)x+ χ(t), (1.55)













































































K(T − t) + 1 + ρεσ(T − t), (1.58)


























Furthermore, the optimal control δˆ ∈ AT is given by













Proof. Given explicit solution (1.54) for u¯(.) we can reverse the transformation (1.49) and
(1.50) to obtain u(.). Finally we reverse the transformation (1.46) to obtain (1.55)–(1.58)
which describes a solution to the HJB equation.
It is clear from their explicit forms that (1.56), (1.57) and (1.58) are bounded, and
so the function defined by (1.55) satisfies the growth condition (1.19) in the verification
Theorem 1. In view of (1.43) and (1.55), the optimal control δˆ is given by (1.59). The
estimates in Corollary 2.10 in Krylov [Kry08] imply immediately that these controls satisfy
the admissibility condition (1.10) in Definition 1.
The function ϕ(.), which determines the strength of skew due to the inventory position
X, decays exponentially towards −K as time approaches the terminal time. This means
that, as the amount of remaining time diminishes, the market maker should become willing
to pay to reduce it by skewing the price and increasing the speed of the drift of the inventory
position towards 0. When we talk about the market maker paying through the skew,
we mean that the market maker absorbs the instantaneous cost of the net change in the
inventory position in the direction of the skew, which is ηδt.
As the time remaining to reduce the position increases, the market maker acts with less
urgency due to the terminal time penalty. However, he remains incentivised to reduce the











Figure 1.2: Decay function ψ(t)
inventory position due to the continuous penalty k. With significant time remaining until
terminal time the size of skew therefore also depends on the continuous penalty term k,






. Whether this skew is more or less dominant for large T − t
than it is for small T − t depends on the relative values of k and K. It is worth noting that
in the absence of any continuous penalty
ϕ(t) = − K
Kη(T − t) + 1 .
Specifically, the size of the market maker’s skew due to the inventory position goes to 0 as
T − t→∞.
The function ψ(.) represents the market maker’s inventory position independent of skew.
This is the skew that the market maker should set to maximise revenue due to any infor-
mational advantage about the drift of the fair price µ. However, in order to benefit from
the drift, the market maker will still have to bear the risk of holding an extra position.
Therefore, the size of this skew, and the implied target position that the market maker
attempts to build up also depends on k and K.
As time remaining goes to 0 so does this component of skew, since expected revenue










a risk-dampened multiple of the size of the drift in the fair price of the asset.





which is an interesting quantity as it is the size of inventory position at which the market
maker will show no skew, so it is effectively the size of position that the market maker is
aiming to hold at any given time to maturity.
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Finally we note that in this context, the correlation between the the asset price S and
the inventory holdings X given by ρ, appears only in χ(.), through the term ρεσ(T − t) but
nowhere in the optimal control δˆ. The economic meaning of ρ is the toxicity of the noise
traders, that is, how correlated their trading activity is with movements in the market. If it
is positive then noise traders sell when the price is moving up, however if it is negative they
buy when the price is moving up. From this we can deduce that in the case with Bachelier
price dynamics, the market maker is unable to counteract trade toxicity, and simply must
accept its impact on the value function.
The infinite horizon case T =∞
We now consider the problem of maximising the objective






(−ηδ2t + µXt + ρσε− kX2t ) du ∣∣∣X0 = x], (1.61)
where the discounting rate β > 0 is a given constant, over all admissible controls δ ∈ A∞





















w2x(x)− βw(x) + µx+ ρεσ − kx2 = 0 (1.64)
which is a non-linear ordinary differential equation similar to the partial differential equation
(1.44) seen in the finite horizon setting. Therefore we approach the problem by suggesting
a candidate form for the solution
w(x) = ϕx2 + ψx+ χ. (1.65)
By substituting (1.65) into (1.64) we can see that ϕ, ψ, and χ should satisfy the algebraic
equations
ηϕ2 − βϕ− k = 0, (1.66)




ηψ2 + ε2ϕ+ ρεσ = 0. (1.68)
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The first algebraic equation (1.66) has two distinct real roots since β2 + 4ηk > 0, and we
note that one is positive and one is negative since kη > 0. Denote the positive and negative







β2 + 4ηk. (1.69)
Lemma 1. The control defined by δˆt = δˆ(Xt), where δˆ is defined by (1.63), and X is
the associated solution to (1.38), which is given by (1.71), is such that the admissibility








in the current context, holds true if ϕ = ϕ− and fails to be true if ϕ = ϕ+.
































































1− e2ηϕT ) .





















∞ if 2ηϕ− β > 0,
0 if 2ηϕ− β < 0.
The result now follows because 2ηϕ+ − β > 0, whereas 2ηϕ− − β < 0.
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (1.36)–(1.39).
The value function of the control problem identifies with the function
w(s, x) = ϕx2 + ψx+ χ (1.72)
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where ϕ = ϕ−,






2 + ε2ϕ− + ρεσ
β
.















Proof. We have already established that (1.72) satisfies the HJB equation. Plainly, this
function satisfies the growth conditions (1.29) and (1.30). We can immediately see from
(1.72) and (1.63) that the optimal control δˆ is given by (1.73). This control δˆ is admissible,
namely, belongs to A∞ thanks to Lemma 1.
4.2 An Explicit Solution: GBM Price Dynamics
We now present a model in which the price process is a geometric Brownian motion. We
assume that S = (0,∞) and we let changes in the unaffected price evolve according to the
dynamics
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt. (1.75)
We consider an appropriate form for the function k(.) which determines how the market
maker’s control changes the prices offered to clients. In Section 4.1 with Bachelier price
dynamics we set k(St, δt) = St + δt so that δt coincided with the difference between the
market maker’s price and the fair price. Here, we consider
k(St, δt) = St(1 + δt) (1.76)
so that δt identifies with the classical return of a trade made at the market maker’s price





Remark 3. Our choice of k(.) is a natural one for the GBM case as it is proportional
to S. However as we will see, we do not rule out choices for the market maker’s skew δ
such that the market maker’s price is negative. We could avoid this possibility by choosing
k(St, δt) = Ste
δt . However in doing so we would create a problem in that our objective
function incentivises the market maker based on revenue, and as δ → −∞, further decreases
in δ correspond to vanishingly small sacrifices in terms of revenue.
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We assume that the market maker’s skew δ is real valued, namely, D = R. We also
assume that the impact of the market maker’s skew is a linear function of δ. Although the
definition of δ has changed, the dynamics of X remain as
dXt = ηδtdt+ εdBt. (1.77)
These dynamics imply that noise traders are incentivised by the returns offered by the
market maker rather than the nominal difference in price to the fair value. To put it
differently, a $1 difference in price when the asset price is $100 is different to a $1 difference
when the price is $1000.
As discussed in Section 1.5, penalties incurred by the market maker for holding open
inventory positions can be modelled as a quadratic function of the inventory holdings,
specifically
Ψ(s, x) = ksx2 and Φ(s, x) = Ksx2. (1.78)
It is worth noting here that in our earlier discussion of the mean-quadratic risk criterion in
Section 1.5, we intended for the constants k and K to combine both the market maker’s
risk aversion parameter λ and the volatility of the asset price σ. We will see later in this
section that σ plays a minor role in the closed form solutions. However k and K, in which
σ is implicitly present features prominently.
We now present two explicit solutions with GBM price dynamics, one on a finite horizon
and one on an infinite horizon.
The finite horizon case T <∞





[−ηδ2t + µXt + ρεσ − kX2t ] dt−KSTX2T ∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x]
(1.79)
over all admissible controls δ ∈ AT , subject to the stochastic dynamics given by (1.75)
and (1.77). The value function of the control problem should identify with an appropriate
solution to the HJB equation
wt(t, s, x) +
1
2
ε2wxx(t, s, x) + ρεσswsx(t, s, x) +
1
2
σ2s2wss(t, s, x) + µsws(t, s, x)
− ksx2 + µsx+ ρεσs+ sup
δ∈R
[




w(T, s, x) = −Ksx2. (1.81)
The skew parameter δ that achieves the maximum in (1.80) is given by
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This first order condition involves wx as it did in the case with Bachelier dynamics (1.43).
However it is now scaled by the value of the risky asset s.
Substituting this δˆ back into the HJB equation (1.80) we obtain
wt(t, s, x) +
1
2









w2x(t, s, x) + µsws(t, s, x)− ksx2 + µsx+ ρεσs = 0, (1.83)
with boundary condition
w(T, s, x) = −Ksx2. (1.84)
Notice that a function of the form w(t, s, x) = swˆ(t, x) will correspond to a solution to







wˆ2x(t, x) + ρεσwˆx(t, x) + µwˆ(t, x)− kx2 + µx+ ρεσ = 0, (1.85)
with boundary condition
wˆ(T, x) = −Kx2. (1.86)
We postulate that a solution exists in the form
wˆ(t, x) = ϕ(t)x2 + ψ(t)x+ χ(t). (1.87)
Substituting this into (1.85), we find that the functions ϕ(.), ψ(.) and χ(.) satisfy[













ηψ2(t) + ε2ϕ(t) + ρεσψ(t) + (µ− β)χ(t) + ρεσ
]
= 0
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. This identity can be true if and only if ϕ(.), ψ(.) and χ(.) satisfy
the system of ordinary differential equations
ϕ′(t) + ηϕ2(t) + (µ− β)ϕ(t)− k = 0, (1.88)
ψ′(t) + (ηϕ(t) + µ− β)ψ(t) + 2ρεσϕ(t) + µ = 0 (1.89)
and
χ′(t) + (µ− β)χ(t) + 1
4
ηψ2(t) + ρεσψ(t) + ε2ϕ(t) + ρεσ = 0. (1.90)
Furthermore, the function given by (1.87) will satisfy the boundary condition (1.86) if
ϕ(T ) = −K, ψ(T ) = 0 and χ(T ) = 0.
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The ODE (1.88) is a constant coefficient Ricatti equation which can be transformed into






z′′(t) + (µ− β) z′(t)− kηz(t) = 0. (1.92)
The initial condition ϕ(T ) = −K under this transformation becomes a Robin boundary
condition
z′(T ) +Kηz(T ) = 0. (1.93)
Since the discriminant of the equation (1.92) is positive there exists two real distinct roots
to the quadratic equation x2 + (µ − β)x − kη = 0 and since 4kη > 0 one of the roots is
positive whist the other is negative. Therefore every solution to (1.92) is given by
z(t) = Aent +Bemt, (1.94)






(µ− β)2 + 4kη. (1.95)
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (1.75)–(1.78).
Then given a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) the value function of the control problem identifies
with the function































Γ = (µ− β) and Θ = n+Kη
m+Kη
.
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Furthermore, the optimal control δˆ ∈ AT is given by













Proof. As we have already established, if the function of the form (1.96) is to identify with
the value function of the control problem, ϕ(.), ψ(.) and χ(.) must satisfy (1.88)–(1.90). To
derive the solution to (1.97) we first note that the solution to (1.92) is of the form (1.94). By
taking derivatives in (1.94) and solving for A and B, we can see that this solution satisfies
the boundary condition (1.93) if












m(n+ ηK)e−m(T−t) − n(m+Kη)e−n(T−t)
)
.
Substituting these expressions into (1.91) the constant C cancels out, and we obtain (1.97).
The ordinary differential equation (1.89) which ψ(.) satisfies is of the form
ψ′(t) + L(t)ψ(t) + 2ρεσϕ(t) + µ = 0

























+ (µ− β) (T − t)




































It follows that ψ(.) is given by (1.98). Moreover it is immediate from (1.90) that the function
χ(.) can be written as (1.99).
The functions ϕ(.) and ψ(.) are both bounded because
(n+ ηK)e−m(T−t) > (m+ ηK)e−n(T−t)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The boundedness of these functions implies the boundedness of χ(.).
It follows that the function defined by the right hand side of (1.96) satisfies the growth
condition (1.19) in the verification Theorem 1. In view of (1.82) and (1.96), the optimal
control δˆ is given by (1.100). The estimates in Corollary 2.10 in Krylov [Kry08] imply
immediately that these controls satisfy the admissibility condition (1.10) in Definition 1.
Corollary 1. At all times t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ(t) < 0 and hence the skew δˆ is an affine function
with negative coefficient of x.
Proof. The function ϕ(.) is of the form (1.97), the denominator is positive since
(n+Kη)e−m(T−t) − (m+Kη)e−n(T−t) ≥ n−m > 0
while the numerator is negative since
m(n+Kη)e−m(T−t) − n(m+Kη)e−n(T−t) ≤ Kη(m− n) < 0.
Remark 4. The explicit form for χ(.) is left in integral form. However it can be solved
explicitly since the integral for ϕ(.) is easy to calculate and the integral for ψ2(.) is also
known in explicit form and involves the Gaussian hypergeometric function. We choose
to omit the explicit form because it is rather long and χ(.) does not feature in either of
the optimal controls, only as the inventory position independent time value in the value
function.
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The infinite horizon case T =∞
We now consider the problem of maximising the objective






[−ηδ2t + µXt + ρεσ − kX2t ] dt ∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (1.104)
where the discounting rate β > 0 is a given constant, over all admissible controls δ ∈ A∞
subject to the stochastic dynamics given by (1.76) and (1.77). In this case, the HJB equation
(1.18) takes the form
1
2
ε2wxx(s, x) + ρεσswsx(s, x) +
1
2
σ2s2wss(s, x) + µsws(s, x)













As in the finite horizon case, its intuitive meaning is that the market maker sets δt such
that the difference in price S˜t − St is equal to half the change in the value function with
respect to x, scaled by the value of the risky asset. Substituting this δˆ back into the HJB
equation (1.105) we obtain
1
2









+ µsws(s, x)− βw(s, x)− ksx2 + µsx+ ρεσs = 0. (1.107)
The non-linear PDE (1.107) can be simplified and the dependency on s removed using






wˆ2x(x) + ρεσwˆx(x) + (µ− β)wˆ(x)− kx2 + µx+ ρεσ = 0. (1.108)
This ODE has the same type of non-linearity that appears in the finite horizon case. There-
fore, we approach it using a candidate solution of the form
wˆ(x) = ϕx2 + ψx+ χ. (1.109)
Substituting (1.109) into (1.108), we can see that ϕ, ψ and χ should satisfy the algebraic
equations
ηϕ2 + (µ− β)ϕ− k = 0 (1.110)
(ηϕ+ (µ− β))ψ + 2ρεσϕ+ µ = 0 (1.111)
(µ− β)χ+ ε2ϕ+ (η
4
ψ + ρεσ)ψ + ρεσ = 0. (1.112)
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The first algebraic equation (1.110) has two distinct real roots since β2 + 4ηk > 0. We note
that one is positive and one is negative since kη > 0. Denote the positive and negative
roots of (1.110) as





(µ− β)2 + 4ηk. (1.113)
Assumption 4. The problem data satisfies µ < β.
This assumption is standard in the stochastic control literature for infinite horizon prob-
lems, and is intuitive. The objective function (1.104) includes an expectation of e−βtSt and
since S is a geometric Brownian motion it is intuitive that µ > β could result in v = ∞.
Consequently we require the assumption to prove the following result.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the problem data satisfies Assumption 4. The control defined by
δˆt = δˆ(St, Xt), where δˆ is defined by (1.106), and X is the associated solution to (1.77),
which is given by (1.115), is such that the admissibility condition (1.17) in Definition 2,










in the current context, holds true if ϕ = ϕ− and fails to be true if ϕ = ϕ+.


















dt+ St (εdBt + σXtdWt)
This allows us to calculate the expectation using Fubini’s theorem as
E [STXT ] =
∫ T
0






















Define a function f(t) = E [StXt]. From (1.116) we see that f(.) satisfies the following
differential equation
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By solving this differential equation it is easy to see that


































dt+ Zt (2εdBt + σXtdWt)
and so
E [ZTXT ] =
∫ T
0













Define another function g(t) = E [ZTST ] and note that this satisfies

























as well as the initial condition
g(0) = Z0X0.
By solving this differential equation, which is similar to the one solved above for f(.), we
see that











































Since the coefficient of e(2ηϕ+µ)T is strictly positive and η > 0 and β > 0, and in addition




























∞ if 2ηϕ+ µ− β > 0
0 if 2ηϕ+ µ− β < 0.
The result now follows since 2ηϕ+ + µ− β > 0 whereas 2ηϕ− + µ− β < 0.
We can now prove the main result of this section.
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Theorem 6. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (1.75)–(1.77)
and suppose that the problem data are such that Assumption 4 holds. Then on the infinite
time horizon T =∞ the value function of the control problem identifies with the function
w(s, x) = s(ϕx2 + ψx+ χ) (1.117)
where ϕ = ϕ−,
ψ = − µ+ 2ρεσϕ
−





















Proof. We have already established that (1.117) satisfies the HJB equation (1.105). We can
also see that this function satisfies the growth conditions (1.29) and (1.30) in verification
Theorem 2. We can immediately see from (1.117) and (1.106) that the optimal control δˆ is
given by (1.118). This control δˆ is admissible, namely, δˆ ∈ A∞ thanks to Lemma 2.
Chapter 2
Hedging and Market Impact
1 Introduction
As in Chapter 1, we study a market in which a market maker provides liquidity to a set of
clients by setting a tradable price as an offset from a known reference price. The market
maker’s primary objective is to make money from the flow of client trades, or as we have
been referring to them, noise traders. The market maker is sensitive to the amount of risk
he is holding at any given time and so, as covered in Chapter 1, will try and skew his price
to avoid build-ups of risk. This comes at a small cost in revenue as skewing the price to
incentivise this risk reducing behaviour means lowering the price at which he will sell or
raising the price at which he will buy.
We now wish to expand the setting in which the market maker operates to include an
additional market, which we will refer to as the interbank market. If skewing is insufficient
to reduce the market maker’s risk he may choose to hedge this risk in the interbank mar-
ket, that is, lay it off with other market makers or professional trading firms and pay a
transaction fee to do so.
To this end we model a two tiered marketplace in which noise traders interact only with
the market maker, whereas the market maker has access to a second pool of liquidity namely
the interbank market. The interbank market is the forum in which large professional trading
firms trade with each other. We might also refer to this market as the primary market in the
sense that it represents the location where price formation occurs and where the majority
of information that market makers use to set prices resides.
To justify this structure it is important to discuss the reasons why noise traders do
not also possess access to the interbank market. To do so requires us to emphasise the
difference between the noise traders, who represent the clients of the market maker, and
professional investors such as our market maker. Typically the market making function
is performed by a trading desk in an investment bank or hedge fund that specialises in
electronic execution and risk management, with a client base that consists of a varied mix
of smaller investors, including but not limited to the trading departments of non-financial
corporations, non-execution focused hedge funds and asset managers, and smaller banks.
47
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These investors may themselves be financial professionals, but if so they are typically not
focused on execution. By this we mean that they do not have the inclination to manage the
execution of their deals themselves, and do not wish to make the fixed investments in fees
and technology infrastructure needed to trade in the primary market. Equally they may
simply lack the scale and resources to make such an investment in execution infrastructure.
Further to these considerations, some markets specify a minimum trade size which may
make trading in the interbank market prohibitive for some market participants. On the
other hand, trading with a bank allows for greater flexibility, including the possibility to
trade in smaller sizes. Furthermore, in general the market maker is compelled by the
competitive nature of markets to offer clients prices that are better than those available in
the interbank market. The definition of a better price may be quite illusive, but roughly
speaking we may assume that it means a smaller bid-offer spread. For this reason the
noise traders may simply opt not to trade in the interbank market, even if such access were
available to them.
Prices shown by the market maker are generally free of arbitrage in the sense that they
are not crossed with the primary market. By this we mean that the market maker’s bid
price is never higher than the primary market offer price or his offer price is lower than
the primary market bid. The two tiered nature of the market would mean this could not
be considered pure arbitrage, but in practice such soft arbitrage will be spotted and the
opportunity to profit seized upon by a client who possesses access to the liquidity provided
by two market makers and can therefore trade in opposite directions with each of them.
Within our model, we wish the representation of the interbank market to capture both
the random arrival of new information expressed through changes in the expected fair
value of the underlying asset, as well as price changes caused by the depletion of liquidity,
that is, through market impact caused by the market participants. These two notions are
clearly intertwined, in some cases the act of trading is itself a signal, sending information
to other market participants, who update their expectations of the fair value of the asset
accordingly, see for example Glosten and Milgrom [GM85]. However for the purposes of
modelling market impact, we will assume that these notions are separable and there exists
a known market impact function, as well as a source of exogenous information which drives
changes in the asset price in the absence of trades.
In addition, price movements in the interbank market might also be due to the actions
of competing market makers, but as this information is private to those market makers,
and as we do not attempt here to model the game theoretic nature of interaction in the
interbank market, we assume that all impact other than that caused by our market maker is
contained in a Brownian motion term. This is quite reasonable in that it allows our market
maker to concentrate on his own market impact.
There is a rich literature relating to market impact models beginning with the founda-
tional work of Bertsimas and Lo [BL98] and Almgren and Chriss [AC99, AC01, Alm03] in
which they formulate the problem of how to optimally split the execution of an order into
smaller pieces, with the objective being minimise some cost function over a set time hori-
zon. This has come to be known as the optimal execution problem and we discuss it in more
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detail in Section 1.1. This model has been extended by many authors. Notably Gatheral
and Schied [GS11] consider the problem with a GBM price process and a time-averaged
VaR risk criteria and Forsyth [For11] considers a mean-variance type model in a continuous
time setting. In contrast to much of the early research into the optimal execution problem,
which focussed on static or deterministic trading strategies, Almgren and Lorenz [LA11]
develop a model to produce adaptive trading strategies. They do so within the frame-
work of the original Almgren Chriss model, as do Schied and Scho¨neborn [SS09] for an
investor with von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences on an infinite time horizon. Alfonsi
et al. [AFS10] introduce an interesting alternative to the Almgren Chriss model in which
rather than separate temporary and permanent impact they include a single temporary but
persistant impact term. Further advances to the model have incorporated singular control
so as to allow for block trades. For example Guo and Zervos [GZ15] develop a model of
multiplicative impact and solve the optimal execution problem in this context.
To the best of our knowledge the model that we study is the first one that considers
market impact from the perspective of a market maker whose revenue depends on minimis-
ing his own market impact when hedging positions. We model the fair value of the asset
as a diffusion process subject to permanent market impact. The market maker’s inven-
tory process is modelled as another controlled diffusion, where both the skew and hedging
controls alter the drift of the process. Our market maker will seek to to maximise a mean-
quadratic performance criterion, of the same type as the one discussed in Chapter 1. We
present closed form solutions in a special case where the asset price is a Bachelier process
with linear permanent and temporary market impact of the Almgren and Chriss type.
In the remainder of this section we describe, in greater detail, the market impact model
and motivate the market maker’s objective function which takes the form of a risk adjusted
revenue function. In Section 2 we present the formal stochastic control problem on both
the finite and infinite time horizons, for which we prove separate verification theorems in
Section 3. Using these theorems, in Section 4 we present the special case for which we
can find closed form expressions for the value function and both the skew control and the
hedging control.
1.1 Market Impact of the Almgren and Chriss Type
The Almgren and Chriss market impact model captures the effects on an asset’s fair price
due to the rate of trading ξ. The model distinguishes two types of impact. The permanent
impact captures changes that forever remain in the fair value of the asset, and that have
magnitude dependent on a function of the trading rate
g(ξt).
The model also considers temporary or transient market impact which is the impact that
occurs as a result of instantaneous liquidity exhaustion. Such liquidity is immediately
replenished with no change to the fair price of the asset. This impact is modelled by
another function
h(ξt).
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The temporary impact can be understood as approximation to the effect of trading in a
limit order book, where a faster rate of trading will require the investor to go deeper into
the order book at each point in time, meaning that it acts like a proportional transac-
tion cost. This impact model was intended as a way of deriving solutions to the optimal
execution problem, and so the agent’s objective function was based on what is known as
implementation shortfall rather than revenue. Perold [Per88] originally defined implemen-
tation shortfall as the difference between the price at inception of an execution and the
average traded rate over the entire execution. It could equivalently be thought of as the
revenue accrued by buying the asset at the inception price and selling it at the average rate
achieved during execution.
In their original paper, Almgren and Chriss used a mean-variance type objective function
where the expectation of the implementation shortfall was penalised by its variance. They
were able to do this as their approach was restricted to deterministic strategies in discrete
time and so does not fall foul of the time inconsistency problems associated with the mean-
variance problem in continuous time. Their intention was to capture the trade off between
the higher market impact created by rapid trading against the higher market risk incurred
by waiting and performing a slow execution. Prior to this the simple case in which the
implementation shortfall alone was minimised was solved and the rate of trading found to
be constant [BL98].
We consider the continuous time version of the Almgren and Chriss model, similar to
the setting considered in [GS11], meaning that the fair price of the asset evolves according
to the dynamics
dSt = µ(St)dt+ g(ξt)dt+ σ(St)dWt.
In these dynamics, the function g(.) models the permanent impact of trading in the inter-
bank market. The purpose of hedging is of course to alter the market maker’s inventory
position, alongside the skew control considered in Chapter 1, and so the market maker’s
inventory evolves according to the dynamics
dXt = ν(Xt, δt)dt+ ξtdt+ e(Xt, δt)dBt
so that hedging feeds directly into the inventory.
1.2 Revenue with Market Impact
When the market maker hedges, that is when ξt 6= 0, there occurs a temporary impact
to the price paid on the trade as well as permanent impact that moves the fair price. As
its name suggests, the temporary impact disappears instantaneously after trading activity
ends. This means that the market maker pays a price of
St + h(ξt)
on hedging trades rather than just St.
The purpose of the market maker’s additional control ξ is to manage the inventory
process X when it cannot be adequately managed by the normal skew process δ. The
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dynamics of the inventory process X show that ξ causes changes in the inventory as the
market maker hedges, along with a corresponding permanent market impact in the price
process S.
Now the market maker’s revenue depends on whether changes to inventory are due to
client trading or hedging, as hedging activity is more expensive for the market maker due to
transient impact, but also because hedging activity causes permanent market impact which
changes the value of the market maker’s remaining inventory holdings.
We can write the revenue function, which in the absence of hedging was given by (1.1)
as
RT (δ, ξ) = −
∫ T
0
S˜t ◦ dXt + (STXT − S0X0).
where the operator ◦ represents the dichotomy between changes in inventory due to client
trading and due to market maker hedging. This operator is defined by
S˜t ◦ dXt = S˜t (ν(Xt, δt)dt+ e(Xt, δt)dBt) + (St + h(ξt))ξtdt
This expression formalises the situation discussed above where noise traders trade at the
market maker’s rate S˜t while hedging trades occur as St + h(ξt). Applying Itoˆ’s product
formula, we obtain the expression
STXT − S0X0 =
∫ T
0








Rearranging terms we derive the expression for market maker’s revenue given by




ν(Xt, δt)(St − k(St, δt))− h(ξt)ξt











We can rewrite this expression as
RT (δ, ξ) =
∫ T
0
R(St, Xt, δt, ξt)dt+MT (2.1)
where
R(St, Xt, δt, ξt) = ν(St, δt)(St − k(St, δt))− h(ξt)ξt
+ (µ(St) + g(ξt))Xt + ρσ(St)e(Xt, δt). (2.2)
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Remark 5. Comparing (2.2) to (1.9) provides insight into the hedging control and its im-
pact on revenue. Hedging reduces revenue directly due to transient price impact through
the −h(ξt)ξt term. This effect should be thought of as a transaction cost paid on hedg-
ing trades. Hedging also changes the value of the remaining inventory position through
permanent price impact, namely the g(ξt)Xt term.
As in Chapter 1, we will include two additional functions in the market maker’s objec-
tive function which we will name Φ(.) and Ψ(.) which represent risk factors (see also the
discussion in Section 1.5. In our special case, we will restrict them to the form
Ψ(s, x) = kx2 and Φ(s, x) = Kx2
to correspond to (1.4) and (1.6). The market maker’s objective function can therefore be






Ψ(St, Xt)dt− Φ(ST , XT )
]
,
which in our special case will be a mean-quadratic objective function.
2 The Market Model and Control Problem
Fix a probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) supporting two standard one-dimensional (Ft)-Brownian
motions W and B. Suppose W and B are correlated with coefficient ρ, namely,
d〈W,B〉t = ρdt.
The system we study comprises four stochastic processes S, X, δ and ξ, namely the fair
price process, the market maker’s inventory process, the market maker’s skew process and
the market maker’s hedging process. The process S has dynamics given by
dSt = µ(St)dt+ g(ξt)dt+ σ(St)dWt, S0 = s (2.3)
and takes values in R. The inventory process has dynamics given by
dXt = ν(Xt, δt)dt+ ξtdt+ e(Xt, δt)dBt, X0 = x (2.4)
taking values in R. The inventory process is affected by the skew δ, while both the fair price
process and the inventory process are affected by the hedging process ξ. The controls δ and
ξ are D and U valued (Ft)-progressively measurable process where D ⊆ R and U ⊆ R are
both open. We assume sufficient conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of a
strong solution to these SDEs (see Assumption 5 and Definition 3 below).
Remark 6. The process S, which represented the unaffected price of the asset in Chapter 1,
now represents the fair price of the asset. The difference is that the fair price is the
unaffected price plus permanent price impact. In the absence of hedging trades, these two
concepts are identical.
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Assumption 5. The functions µ : R → R, g : U → R, σ : R → R, ν : R × D → R and
e : R×D → R are C1 and there exists a constant C > 0 such that
|µ(s)|+ |σ(s)| ≤ C(1 + |s|),
|µ′(s)|+ |g′(u)|+ |σ′(s)|+ |νx(x, δ)|+ |ex(x, δ)| ≤ C,
|g(u)| ≤ C(1 + |u|),
and
|ν(x, δ)|+ |e(x, δ)| ≤ C(1 + |x|+ |δ|)
for all (s, x, u, δ) ∈ R× R× U ×D.
2.1 The Control Problem for T <∞
The market maker’s objective is to maximise the mean-quadratic revenue criterion which
was derived in Section 1.2. In particular, we define the market maker’s objective function
by
JT,s,x(δ, ξ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
e−Λt [R(St, Xt, δt, ξt)−Ψ(St, Xt)] dt
− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (2.5)
over all pairs of admissible controls (δ, ξ). Here e−Λt again represents the subjective dis-





for some measurable function β(.) and R(.) is given by (2.2).
Definition 3. Given a time horizon T > 0, the set of admissible controls AT is all pairs















for all m ∈ N.
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The value function of the control problem is defined by
v(T, s, x) = sup
(δ,ξ)∈AT
JT,s,x(δ, ξ)
for all s ∈ R and x ∈ R.
Using standard stochastic control theory that can be found, e.g., in Pham [Pha09],
we expect that the value function v of the stochastic control problem will identify with a
function w : [0, T ]× R× R→ R that solves the HJB equation
wt(t, s, x) + sup
(δ,ξ)∈D×U
[
Lδ,ξw(t, s, x) + F (s, x, δ, ξ)
]
= 0 (2.8)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R, with terminal condition
w(T, s, x) = −Φ(s, x), (2.9)
where the differential operator Lδ,ξ is defined by
Lδ,ξw(t, s, x) = 1
2
σ2(s)wss(t, s, x) + ρe(x, δ)σ(s)wsx(t, s, x) +
1
2
e2(x, δ)wxx(t, s, x)
+ (µ(s) + g(ξ))ws(t, s, x) + (ν(x, δ) + ξ)wx(t, s, x)− β(s, x)w(t, s, x), (2.10)
for δ ∈ D and ξ ∈ U , and
F (s, x, u, δ) = R(s, x, u, δ)−Ψ(s, x) (2.11)
for (s, x, u, δ) ∈ R× R× U ×D.
Assumption 6. The functions F : R×R×U ×D → R and Φ : R×R→ R are continuous
and are such that
|F (s, x, u, δ)|+ |Φ(s, x)| ≤ C
(
1 + |s|k + |x|k + |u|k + |δ|k
)
for all (s, x, u, δ) ∈ R × R × U × D, where k ∈ N and C > 0 are constants. Also the
discounting rate β(.) takes values in R+.
2.2 The Control Problem for T =∞
Over an infinite time horizon, the market maker’s objective is to maximise the performance
criterion







R(St, Xt, δt, ξt)−Ψ(St, Xt)
]
dt
∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (2.12)
over all pairs of admissible controls (δ, ξ).
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Definition 4. The family of all admissible controls A∞ is the set of all pairs of processes





e−ΛT |Ψ(ST , XT )|
]
= 0 (2.13)
where X is the associated solution to (2.4).
Assumption 7. The discounting rate function β(.) is such that
β(s, x) > ε > 0
for all s ∈ R and x ∈ R, for some constant ε.
Remark 7. The condition (2.13) rules out strategies that do not sufficiently control the
inventory position. Making reference to our discussion on the appropriate forms of Ψ(.) in
Chapter 1, any optimal strategy that fails to satisfy (2.13) would necessarily involve the
build up of larger and larger positions in such a way that expected future gains offset the
increasing size of the penalty term.
The value function associated with the control problem on the infinite time horizon is
defined by
v(s, x) = sup
(δ,ξ)∈A∞
J∞,s,x(δ)
for s ∈ R and x ∈ R. We opt to repeat the usage of v to represent the value function on
the infinite horizon, as the context will ensure there is no ambiguity.
Again, we expect that the value function v of the stochastic control problem on the




Lδ,ξw(s, x) + F (St, Xt, δ, ξ)
]
= 0 (2.14)
for all (s, x) ∈ R×R, where Lδ,ξ is the differential operator (2.10) and F is given by (2.11).
3 Verification Theorems
We now prove two verification theorems for the control problem described in Section 2, first
for the finite time horizon and then for the infinite horizon.
Theorem 7 (Finite Time Horizon: T <∞). Let w : [0, T ]×R×R→ R be a C1,2,2 solution
to the HJB equation (2.8) and (2.9) that satisfies the polynomial growth condition
|ws(t, s, x)|+ |wx(t, s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (2.15)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(0, s, x) ≥ v(T, s, x) (2.16)
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for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R×R. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a pair of measurable
functions δˆ : [0, T ]× R× R→ D and ξˆ : [0, T ]× R× R→ U such that
wt(t, St, Xt) + Lδˆ(t,St,Xt),ξˆ(t,St,Xt)w(t, St, Xt) + F (St, Xt, δˆ(t, St, Xt), ξˆ(t, St, Xt))
= wt(t, St, Xt) + sup
(δ,ξ)∈D×U
[
Lδ,ξw(t, St, Xt) + F (St, Xt, δ, ξ)
]
. (2.17)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R. Also, suppose that the controlled diffusions
dSt = µ(St)dt+ g(ξˆ(t, St, Xt))dt+ σ(St)dWt
and
dXt = ν(Xt, δˆ(t, St, Xt))dt+ ξˆ(t, St, Xt)dt+ e(Xt, δˆ(t, St, Xt))dBt
admit unique strong solutions, and
δˆt = δˆ(t, St, Xt)
and
ξˆt = ξˆ(t, St, Xt)
together define a pair of processes in AT . Then (δˆ, ξˆ) is an optimal skew-hedging pair and
w(0, s, x) = v(T, s, x) (2.18)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R.

















for all k ≥ 1. Using Itoˆ’s formula we obtain









+ ρe(Xu, δu)σ(Su)wsx(u, Su, Xu) +
1
2
e2(Xu, δu)wxx(u, Su, Xu)






σ(Su)ws(u, Su, Xu)dWu +
∫ T
0
e(Xu, δu)wx(u, Su, Xu)dBu.
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Applying the integration by parts formula to e−Λtw(t, St, Xt), we calculate














e2(Xu, δu)wxx(u, Su, Xu)
+ (µ(Su) + g(ξu))ws(u, Su, Xu)
+ (ν(Xu, δu) + ξu)wx(u, Su, Xu)







e−Λtσ(St)ws(t, St, Xt)dWt +
∫ T
0
e−Λte(Xt, δt)wx(t, St, Xt)dBt. (2.22)
Using Itoˆ’s isometry, Assumption 6, the growth condition on ws and wx given by (2.15),
the admissibility conditions for δ and ξ given by (2.6) and (2.7) and the estimates (2.19)




























(1 + |Su|k¯ + |Xu|k¯ + |δu|k¯)du
]
<∞. (2.23)
where k¯ ∈ N and C¯ > 0 are appropriate constants. Therefore M is a square integrable
martingale. Furthermore, Assumption 6 implies that
E
[
e−ΛT |Φ(ST , XT )|
] ≤ C (1 + E [|ST |k]+ E [|XT |k]) <∞

































Since the pair of controls (δ, ξ) may not achieve the supremum in (2.8) we have the following
inequality
− F (St, Xt, δt, ξt) ≥ wt(t, St, Xt) + Lδt,ξtw(t, St, Xt). (2.25)
Consequently, by substituting (2.25) and (2.9) into (2.21) and taking expectations, we
may write




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu, ξt)du
]
.
Rearranging terms we derive the inequality
JT,s,x(δ, ξ) ≡ E
[∫ T
0
e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu, ξu)du− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
]
≤ w(0, S0, X0)
which implies (2.16) because (δ, ξ) ∈ AT has been arbitrary.
If we take (δˆ, ξˆ) in place of (δ, ξ), then (2.25) holds with equality and
JT,s,x(δˆ, ξˆ) ≡ E
[∫ T
0
e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δˆu, ξˆu)du− e−ΛTΦ(ST , XT )
]
= w(0, S0, X0)
Together with (2.16), this identity results in (2.18) as well as the optimality of (δˆ, ξˆ).
Theorem 8 (Infinite Time Horizon: T =∞). Let w : R×R→ R be a C2,2 solution to the
HJB equation (2.14) that satisfies the polynomial growth conditions
|w(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |Ψ(s, x)|) (2.26)
and
|ws(s, x)|+ |wx(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (2.27)
for all (s, x) ∈ R× R for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(s, x) ≥ v(s, x) (2.28)
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for all (s, x) ∈ R×R. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a pair of measurable functions
δˆ : R× R→ D and ξˆ : R× R→ U such that




Lδ,ξw(St, Xt) + F (St, Xt, δ, ξ)
]
(2.29)
for all (s, x) ∈ R× R. Also suppose that the controlled diffusions
dSt = µ(St)dt+ g(ξˆ(St, Xt))dt+ σ(St)dWt
and
dXt = ν(Xt, δˆ(St, Xt))dt+ ξˆ(St, Xt)dt+ e(Xt, δˆ(St, Xt))dBt
admit unique strong solutions,
δˆt = δˆ(St, Xt)
and
ξˆt = ξˆ(St, Xt)
together define a pair of processes in A∞. Then (δˆ, ξˆ) is an optimal skew-hedging pair and
w(s, x) = v(s, x) (2.30)
for all (s, x) ∈ R× R.
Proof. Fix any pair of admissible controls (δ, ξ) ∈ A∞. Applying Itoˆ’s formula and the
integration by parts formula we obtain











e2(Xu, δu)wxx(Su, Xu) + (µ(Su) + g(ξu))ws(Su, Xu)












Arguing as in (2.23), we can see that M is a square integrable martingale. Furthermore,
since δ and ξ may not achieve the supremum in (2.14) we have the inequality
− F (St, Xt, δt, ξt) ≥ Lδt,ξtw(St, Xt). (2.32)
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Recalling (2.24), we substitute (2.32) into (2.31) and take expectations to obtain
E
[
e−ΛTw(ST , XT )




e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu, ξu)du
]
.
In view of Assumption 7, (2.13) in Definition 4 and (2.26), we can pass to the limit T →∞
through an appropriate subsequence to obtain





e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δu, ξu)du
]
≤ w(S0, X0),
which implies (2.28) because (δ, ξ) ∈ A∞ has been arbitrary.
If we take (δˆ, ξˆ) ∈ A∞ in place of (δ, ξ), then (2.32) holds with equality





e−ΛuF (Su, Xu, δˆu, ξˆu)du
]
= w(S0, X0)
Together with (2.28), this identity results in (2.30) as well as the optimality of (δˆ, ξˆ).
4 A Special Case with Explicit Solution
We consider a specific choice for the dynamics of the asset price S and the inventory process
X for which we are able to find explicit solutions. Our case corresponds closely to the
Bachelier dynamics studied in Section 4.1, however with additional impact terms due to
market maker hedging.
We assume that the market maker’s skew δ as well as the rate of trading ξ are real
valued, namely D = U = R. We also assume that both permanent and transient market
impact are linear functions of the rate of trading, that is
g(ξ) = λξ and h(ξ) = γξ. (2.33)
The fair price of the asset follows the controlled arithmetic Brownian motion given by
dSt = (µ+ λξt)dt+ σdWt. (2.34)
We also assume that the market maker’s inventory process is modelled by
dXt = (ηδt + ξt)dt+ εdBt. (2.35)




R(Su, Xu, δu, ξu)du+Mt,
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where
R(St, Xt, δt, ξt) = −ηδ2 − γξ2t + (µ+ λξt)Xt + ρσε. (2.36)
We assume that the market maker’s time discounting occurs at a constant rate β.
As we did in Chapter 1, we assume that the risk functions Φ(.) and Ψ(.) are quadratic
in x, specifically
Ψ(s, x) = −kx2 and Φ(s, x) = −Kx2. (2.37)
It is worth noting here that in our earlier discussion of the mean-quadratic risk criterion in
Section 1.5, we intended for the constants k and K to combine both the market maker’s
risk aversion parameter λ and the volatility of the asset price σ. We will see later in this
section that σ plays a minor role in the closed form solutions. However k and K, in which
σ is implicitly present, features prominently.
We now present three explicit solutions in which Assumption 8 below plays an impor-
tant role. In Section 4.1, we find an explicit solution on a finite time horizon in which
Assumption 8 is satisfied. In Section 4.2, we do the same on an infinite time horizon. In
Section 4.2 we consider the case on the finite time horizon where it does not hold, and find
that given a long enough time horizon the value function may be infinite.













4.1 An Explicit Solution: Finite Time Horizon T <∞
The market maker’s objective is to maximise the performance criterion








∣∣∣X0 = x], (2.38)
over all admissible controls (δ, ξ) ∈ AT , subject to the stochastic dynamics given by (2.35).
We immediate see from (2.38) that in this setting the objective function is independent of
the value of St. We may therefore drop it from consideration and so the value function of

















w(T, x) = −Kx2. (2.40)










(wx(t, x) + λx). (2.42)
These conditions can provide insight into the optimal solution. The market maker skews
his price up in proportion to the marginal increase in the value function with respect to
increases in inventory given by wx. This is because doing so will help incentivise noise
traders to sell to the market maker. Similarly the market maker will hedge in proportion to
wx, but also in proportion to λx, which is the increase in value of the current inventory that
would be caused by the market maker’s hedging, which causes permanent market impact.
We also note that the market maker’s rate of trading is scaled by γ, which is the temporary
impact caused by trading, which reduces revenue.
Substituting (2.41) and (2.42) into the HJB equation (2.39), we see that the value






















x2 + µx+ ρεσ = 0 (2.43)
with boundary condition
w(0, x) = −Kx2. (2.44)
We postulate that a solution exists in the form
w(t, x) = ϕ(t)x2 + ψ(t)x+ χ(t). (2.45)
















































ψ2(t) + ε2ϕ(t)− βχ(t) + ρεσ
)
= 0
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. This identity can be true if and only if ϕ(.), ψ(.) and χ(.) satisfy































ψ(t) + µ = 0 (2.47)
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and







ψ(t)2 + ε2ϕ(t) + ρεσ = 0. (2.48)
Furthermore, the function given by (2.45) will satisfy the boundary condition (2.44) if
ϕ(T ) = −K, ψ(T ) = 0 and χ(T ) = 0.
The ODE (2.46) is a constant coefficient Ricatti equation which can be transformed into
a second order linear ODE. Indeed, the transformation
ϕ(t) =
z′(t)



















z(t) = 0. (2.50)








z(T ) = 0. (2.51)
If Assumption 8 holds, the differential equation (2.50) has positive discriminant and so every
solution to it is given by
z(t) = Aent +Bemt, (2.52)


























We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 9. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (2.35) and sup-
pose that Assumption 8 holds. Then given a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) the value function of
the control problem identifies with the function











eΓ(T−t) − e−n(T−t))− Θm+Γ (eΓ(T−t) − e−m(T−t))
e−n(T−t) −Θe−m(T−t) (2.55)
































Furthermore, the optimal controls (δˆ, ξˆ) ∈ AT are given by







































Proof. As we have already established, if the function of the form (2.53) is to identify with
the value function of the control problem, ϕ(.), ψ(.) and χ(.) must satisfy (2.46)–(2.48). To
derive the solution to (2.46), we first note that the solution to (2.50) is of the form (2.52) if
Assumption 8 holds true. By taking derivatives in (2.52) and solving for A and B, we can
































Substituting these expressions into (2.49), the constant C cancels out, and we obtain (2.54).
The ordinary differential equation (2.47), which ψ(.) satisfies, is of the form
ψ′(t) + L(t)ψ(t) + µ = 0
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ϕ(t) + Γ =
z′(t)
z(t)



























It follows that ψ(.) is given by (2.55). Moreover it is immediate from (2.48) that the solution
χ(.) can be written as (2.56).
The functions ϕ(.) and ψ(.) are both bounded because either Θ < 0 or Θ > 1. In the
former case
e−n(T−t) −Θe−m(T−t) > 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ], whereas in the latter case
e−n(T−t) −Θe−m(T−t) < 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The boundedness these functions implies the boundedness of χ(.). It follows
that the function defined by the right hand side of (2.53) satisfies the growth condition (2.15)
in the verification Theorem 7. In view of (2.41), (2.42) and (2.45), the optimal controls ξˆ
and δˆ are given by (2.57) and (2.58). The estimates in Corollary 2.10 in Krylov [Kry08]
imply immediately that these controls satisfy the admissibility conditions (2.6) and (2.7) in
Definition 3.
Remark 8. The explicit form for χ(.) is left in integral form. However it can be solved
explicitly since the integral for ϕ(.) is easy to calculate and the integral for ψ2(.) is also
known in explicit form and involves the Gaussian hypergeometric function. We choose to
omit the explicit form because it is rather long and χ(.) does not feature in either of the
optimal controls, only as a function of time in the value function.
Corollary 2. The time-reversed impact function ϕ¯(τ) := ϕ(T −τ) is increasing or decreas-















Figure 2.1: Decay function ϕ¯(τ)
























Remark 9. As the transient market impact and thereby the cost of trading increases, the
magnitude the the market maker’s hedging activity decreases. As γ →∞ we see that ξˆ → 0
and the optimal solution reduces to that of the market marker’s problem considered in
Chapter 1.
Remark 10. As K → ∞ the market maker’s incentive to reduce remaining inventory
holdings at T = t increases. Specifically, since Θ→ 1 this means that ϕ(t)→∞ as t→ T
and the problem resembles an optimal execution problem.
Remark 11. By completing the square in the value function, which under appropriate
conditions takes the form of a negative quadratic, we may rewrite the value function as
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4.2 An Explicit Solution: Infinite Time Horizon T =∞
We now consider the problem of maximising the objective







− ηδ2 − γξ2t
+ (µ+ λξt)Xt + ρσε− kX2t
]
dt
∣∣∣X0 = x], (2.61)
where the discounting rate β > 0 is a given constant, over all admissible controls (δ, ξ) ∈ A∞













ξwx(x) + λξx− γξ2
]
= 0 (2.62)









(wx(x) + λx). (2.64)





















x2 + µx+ ρεσ = 0 (2.65)
The non-linear ODE (2.65) is similar to one we have seen in Chapter 1 and similar to
the PDE we solved for the finite horizon case. Therefore we approach it using a candidate
solution of the form
w(x) = ϕx2 + ψx+ χ. (2.66)




























ψ + µ = 0 (2.68)









ψ2 + ε2ϕ+ ρεσ = 0. (2.69)
















which is guaranteed by Assumption 8. Since η + 1γ > 0, these roots are both positive if
β > λγ and k <
λ2
4γ , both negative if β <
λ
γ and k <
λ2
4γ , and one negative one positive if
k > λ
2














To determine which of these two roots is associated with the expression for w given by
(2.66) that identifies with the problem’s value function, we prove the following result.
















The controls defined by δˆt = δˆ(Xt) and ξˆt = ξˆ(Xt), where δˆ and ξˆ are given by (2.63) and
(2.64), and X is the associated solution to (2.35), which is given by (2.73), are such that








in the current context, holds true if ϕ = ϕ− and fails to hold true if ϕ = ϕ+.



































CHAPTER 2. HEDGING AND MARKET IMPACT 69




















































































) (1− e2((η+ 1γ )ϕ+ λ2γ )T) .





































ϕ+ λ2γ < 0.








ϕ+ + λγ − β > 0.
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 10. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (2.35) and
(2.61) and suppose that the problem data are such that Assumption 8 holds. The value
function of the control problem identifies with the function
w(x) = ϕx2 + ψx+ χ, (2.74)
















ψ2 + ε2ϕ+ ρεσ
β
.










































Proof. We have already established that (2.74) satisfies the HJB equation (2.62). We can
also see that this function satisfies the growth conditions (2.26) and (2.27) in verification
Theorem 8. We can immediately see from (2.63), (2.64) that the controls δˆ and ξˆ are of
the form (2.75) and (2.76). These controls are admissible, namely, (δˆ, ξˆ) ∈ A∞ thanks to
Lemma 3.
Remark 12. We have characterised all solutions to the control problem on both the finite
















Under this assumption, the value function is finite and, in general, the market maker uses
both controls to attempt to reduce the outstanding inventory position whilst taking advan-
tage of the drift µ. See Remark 13 for a caveat. This strong economic meaning matches
our intuition of how a market maker should behave whilst disincentivised from holding
risk. Indeed, Assumption 8 holds true when the market maker’s continuous risk penalty k
sufficiently outweighs the market maker’s ability to influence the fair price through market
impact λ. It highlights an interesting feature of market impact models that cannot be ob-
served in the traditional market impact literature; market impact is a double edged sword
which causes a negative effect when reducing a position, but a positive effect when increas-
ing a position. Therefore Assumption 8 has the implicit meaning that situations in which
the market maker is able to use the market impact caused by hedging to benefit himself by
pushing up the value of the current inventory position should not be allowed in the model.
We investigate in the next section what happens when these situations occur.
Remark 13. We notice that it is possible for the smaller root of (2.67) to satisfy the
condition specified in Lemma 3 whilst being positive. For this to occur we need to have
β > λγ and k <
λ2
4γ in which case both roots of (2.67) are positive. This is slightly counter
intuitive, because it means that the market maker chooses to skew upwards and buy the
asset when the inventory position is positive, and skew downwards and sell the asset when
the inventory position is negative. This behaviour would normally be associated with an
exploding value function and so would result in a failure of the transversality condition. In
this case, assuming no drift in the fair price of the asset, we see that the controlled process
X is given by
dXt = aXtdt+ εdBt
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where 0 < a < β. We add that this situation is somewhat atypical, in the sense that the
market maker is able to derive excess benefit by moving the market in the same direction as
the current inventory position, which he does by increasing or decreasing ξ. This is possible
because λ is small and k is not great enough to disincentivise the accumulation of a large
position. However β is simultaneously large enough, meaning that this accumulated benefit
is discounted to zero as time goes to ∞.
4.3 An Explicit Solution: Exploding Value Function T <∞
We now investigate the case with a finite time horizon where Assumption 8 is false, which
intuitively means that the market impact term is large relative to the cost of holding inven-
















Theorem 11. Consider the control problem with problem data described in (2.33)–(2.35)
and (2.37), and suppose that the problem data fails to satisfy Assumption 8 namely, the
inequality (2.78) holds true. Given a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and time to maturity τ = T−t
the value function of the control problem takes the form
v(T, x) =
{
ϕ(t)x2 + ψ(t)x+ χ(t), T − t < τ∗,















cos (ζ(T − t))(
η + 1γ
) [





2γ −K(η + 1γ )
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Furthermore, τ∗ is defined as the first explosion point of the time reversed functions ϕ¯(τ) =
ϕ(T − τ) and ψ¯(τ) = ψ(T − τ), namely
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Proof. For easier reference, we recall the ODE (2.50) and its associated Robin boundary

























z(0) = 0. (2.83)










A sin (ζ(T − t)) +B cos (ζ(T − t))
]
, (2.84)






















By taking derivatives and solving for A and B, we can see that this solution satisfies the




































sin (ζ(T − t))
]
. (2.85)
Differentiating and substituting back into (2.49), we derive the expression (2.79).
To derive ψ(.) we notice that the ordinary differential equation (2.47) which ψ(.) satisfies



























ϕ(.) identifies with z
′(.)
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β(T−u) [cos(ζ(T − t))−Θ sin(ζ(T − t))] du















Again, this integral can be solved explicitly.
In view of the expression
ϕ¯′(τ) =

























we can see that
ϕ¯′(τ) > 0 ∀ τ < τ∗
and
ϕ¯(τ)→∞ as τ → τ∗.
All that remains to show is that the value function v goes to ∞ as τ ≡ T − t→ τ∗. To
this end, we consider the control processes







































X is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that admits the expression
Xt = P (t)
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where















Recalling (2.38), we can see that the performance of these controls over the interval [t, T ]
is given by


















































































































J(0, x) = −Kx2.
Substituting the choice
J(τ, x) = a(τ)x2 + b(τ)x+ c(τ) (2.90)











































ψ¯(τ) (a(τ)− ϕ¯(τ)) + µ = 0














ψ¯2(τ) + ε2a(τ) + ρεσ = 0
with terminal conditions
a(0) = −K, b(0) = 0 and c(0) = 0.
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It is straightforward to check that the choices a(.) = ϕ¯(.), b(.) = ψ¯(.) and c(.) = χ¯(.) where
ϕ¯(.), ψ¯(.) and χ¯(.) are as above satisfy this system of ODEs.
As τ → τ∗ we know from (2.87) that ϕ¯(τ) → ∞. From this we can also deduce that
χ¯(τ)→∞ as the explicit form of χ¯(.), seen in (2.56), is an integral involving only positive
multiples of ψ2(.) and ϕ(.). We also deduce that P (.)→∞ from the observation that P (.)
is an exponential function of a positive multiple of ϕ(.).
It is therefore easy to see that in (2.90) the first and final terms go to∞. It follows that
lim
τ→τ∗ J(τ, x) =∞
and the value function v is infinite for all t ∈ [0, T ] such that T − t > τ∗.
Remark 14. We would expect to also find that the functions ψ¯(.) and χ¯(.) exhibit a similar
monotonicity in time remaining to that found for ϕ¯(.) in (2.87). However since there is only
marginal interest in obtaining such a result we have left this for future work.
5 Singular Hedging
The model we have studied in this chapter included a hedging control, namely ξ, which
represented the rate of hedging of the market maker’s inventory. The use of a rate of trading
ensured that the hedging control was absolutely continuous with respect to time, a modelling
assumption that was in line with the classical approach of Almgren and Chriss [AC01].
We now consider an extension of the model, specifically allowing the market maker’s
hedging control to be singular. The market maker would then be able to clear inventory
positions in blocks rather than being restricted to a rate of trading. Unlike the previous
section, we will not prove a formal verification theorem, but will instead simply derive the
HJB equation for which we can find numerical solutions and consider its properties.
In this context, permanent impact on the fair price process should depend on the mag-
nitude of trades that occur. We distinguish market maker buying Ξb from market maker
selling Ξs by specifying two controls each of which is an increasing (Ft)-progressively mea-
surable process. We restrict our attention to the case of linear impact functions λdΞbt and
λdΞst and assume that in the absence of trade the fair price follows a Bachelier process. The
fair price process will evolve according to the dynamics
dSt = µdt− λdΞst + λdΞbt + σdWt
for some constant λ > 0. Furthermore the dynamics of the market maker’s inventory
holdings are given by
dXt = ηδtdt− dΞst + dΞbt + εdBt
which is the combination of noise trader activity and the market maker’s hedging trades.
Recall from Section 1.1 that transient impact in the Almgren and Chriss model is effec-
tively a proportional transaction cost. We therefore assume that transient impact is a fixed
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proportion of the trade size, so that buy trades occur at a price of
St + Cb
and similarly, sell trades occur at a price
St − Cs
for some constants Cb > 0 and Cs > 0. Following the same approach as in Section 1.2, we




























An application of Itoˆ’s formula gives
d(Sft Xt) = Xt(µdt− λdΞst + λdΞbt + σdWt) + St(−ηδtdt− dΞst + dΞbt + εdBt) + ρσεdt,




















Consider the infinite horizon objective function, which is simply the mean-quadratic objec-






















for x ∈ R. At any given time t the market maker has three options to choose from. Firstly
he may set δ to a fixed value and wait for a short period ∆t, and then continue optimally.
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e−βs(−ηδ2s + µXs + ρσ− kX2s )ds+ e−β∆tv(Xt+∆t)
]
.
Using Itoˆ’s formula, dividing by ∆t and passing to the limit as ∆t ↓ 0, we obtain




ε2vxx(x) + ηδvx(x)− ηδ2 + µx+ ρεσ − kx2.





Therefore, we obtain the inequality







ηv2x(x) + µx+ ρεσ − kx2.
The second possibility is to buy a small amount  of the asset, which we know from (2.91)
will cost the market maker a transaction cost Cb. There will however be a secondary effect
in that the market maker will, due to the permanent component of market impact, alter
the fair value of his current holdings by an amount λXt. Consequently we can state the
inequality
v(x) ≥ v(x+ ) + (λx− Cb),
which for infinitesimally small  corresponds to
0 ≥ vx(x) + λx− Cb.
Similarly for selling
0 ≥ −wx(x)− λx− Cs.
Therefore we expect that the value function v of the problem will identify with a smooth
solution w to the variational inequality
max
{L¯w(x)− βw(x), wx(x) + λx− Cb, −wx(x)− λx− Cs} = 0. (2.92)
We cannot hope to find a closed form solution to (2.92). However we may solve it numerically
using the smoothness of w. We postulate three regions W, B and S
W = {x ∈ R | Lw(x)− βw(x) = 0} ,
B = {x ∈ R | wx(x) + λx− Cb = 0} ,
S = {x ∈ R | − wx(x)− λx− Cs = 0} ,
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and propose that the three the regions are such that
B ∪W ∪ S = R.
In particular, we postulate that the regions are characterised by constants, F and G and
take the form
W = {x ∈ R | F ≤ x < G} ,
B = {x ∈ R | x < F} ,
S = {x ∈ R | x ≥ G} .
The solution approach we take combines an analytical solution in the regions B and S
with a numerical solution in the region W. We combine these into a single smooth solution
by using a variant of the so called shooting method. We begin by solving the problem in the




x2 + Cbx+ a
for some constant a and x ∈ B,
w(x) = −λ
2
x2 − Csx+ b
for some constant b and x ∈ S. The constants a and b will be used to preserve the continuity
of our solution at the boundaries x = F and x = G.
Inside the region W, we look to find a function w¯ that satisfies
L¯w(x)− βw(x) = 0 (2.93)
as well as
w¯′(F ) = −λF + Cb,
w¯′(G) = −λG− Cs, (2.94)
and
w¯′′(F ) = w¯′′(G) = −λ. (2.95)
so that when combined together the three solutions form a single C2 function. Equations
(2.94) and (2.95) arise from the assumed smoothness of the value function, and correspond
to the so called value matching and smooth pasting properties at the optimal exercise
boundary in American option pricing problems.
Denote by w¯Fi,Gi(x) the numerical solution to the Dirichlet boundary value problem,
namely a solution to (2.93) and (2.94) where the boundaries are located at Fi and Gi.
Such numerical solutions, even for non-linear ODEs are simple to solve using mathemat-
ical software packages. We then proceed by choosing arbitrary initial points F0 and G0,
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x
w(x)
Figure 2.2: Value function w(.)
and calculate an initial candidate solution w¯F0,G0(x). Any such solution satisfies the re-
quirements for a solution w¯ other than (2.95). We apply a root finding algorithm such
as the secant method or the bisection method to the functions f(F ) = w¯′′F,G(F ) + λ and
g(G) = w¯′′F,G(G) + λ together until convergence is achieved. After convergence is achieved,
we are left with a numerical solution w¯ that satisfies (2.92) in the region W and the mixed
boundary condition (2.94) and (2.95). Furthermore, the function
w(x) =

−λ2x2 + Cbx+ w¯(F ) + λ2F 2 − CbF, for x ∈ B,
−λ2x2 − Csx+ w¯(G) + λ2G2 + CsG, for x ∈ S,
w¯(x), for x ∈ W,
is a C2 solution to (2.92).
The optimal hedging control, which is a singular control, will be to buy or sell so as to
ensure that the controlled inventory process Xˆ is a reflecting diffusion inside the waiting
region W. The optimal hedging control ξˆ will be the difference between the local times
of Xˆ at the boundaries of B and S. This type of control also appears in the work of
Davis and Norman [DN90] in their study of portfolio selection with transaction costs. An
interesting expansion of this model would be to follow the approach of Kallsen and Muhle-
Karbe [KMK15] and Muhle-Karbe, Reppen and Soner [MKRS16], who consider the case
in which transaction costs are small and proportional to the asset price, allowing them to
obtain explicit results for the asymptotic case as a good approximation to the full model.
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x
w'(x)
Figure 2.3: First derivative of value function w′(.)
x
w''(x)
Figure 2.4: Second derivative of value function w′′(.)
Chapter 3
Portfolio Theory in a Market with
Support and Resistance Levels
1 Introduction
We consider the optimisation problem faced by a single agent who possesses wealth con-
sisting of an initial endowment x which may be consumed or invested over an interval
[0, T ]. Consuming wealth too quickly will reduce the amount of capital available to grow
via investment, whereas investment is inherently risky and is not guaranteed to result in
greater wealth being available for future consumption. The agent is therefore faced with
the challenge of how to set these dual controls in order to maximise his total utility from
both consumption and investment. The study of this type of problem is known as port-
folio optimisation theory and has a long history. At the origin of the area is the work of
Merton [Mer69], who, building on earlier insights made by Markowitz [Mar52], considered
stochastic dynamics for the traded assets in continuous time and power utility functions.
The model that we study in this chapter falls within the context of the Merton model.
However we introduce asset prices that include singularities in their drift. The purpose of
this is to represent support and resistance levels, that is, price points at which the market
exhibits either an upward or downward singularity in contrast to its normal behaviour.
Specifically of interest is how the agent should respond to optimally adjust his holdings of
the asset and rate of consumption when such levels are present in the market.
Stochastic processes that exhibit precisely this behaviour are well known. Diffusions
with generalised drift, such as those considered in Lejay [Lej06], are a generalisation of
the skew Brownian motion the properties of which have been studied by Walsh [Wal78],
Harrison and Shepp [HS81], and Engelbert and Schmidt [ES85], among others. The skew
Brownian motion behaves like a Brownian motion away from a given level, but once it hits
that level the side of the level on which it makes its next excursion depends on the outcome
of an independent Bernoulli random variable. It can be shown that the skew Brownian
motion is the strong solution to a SDE involving its local time at the level in question.
In the remainder of this section we provide some more details on some concepts central
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to this chapter. We discuss the phenomena which we study, namely, support and resistance
levels and give some background on the skew Brownian motion which we use to model them.
We then provide a brief summary of the results of the classic Merton model, both to provide
a benchmark from which to measure the difference that including support and resistance
levels creates, and also for use as a limiting case of our model away from the support
and resistance levels. In Section 2 of the chapter we present the formal stochastic control
problem on both the finite and infinite time horizons, for which we will prove separate
verification theorems in Section 3. Using these theorems, in Section 4 and 5 of the chapter
we present closed form expressions for the value function and the controls.
1.1 Modelling Support and Resistance Levels
We wish to model points of support and resistance in the asset price around which the
asset price process experiences an impact in its drift. A standard definition of support and
resistance levels is given by Murphy [Mur99]:
“Support is a level or area on the chart under the market where buying interest
is sufficiently strong to overcome selling pressure. As a result, a decline is halted
and prices turn back again . . . Resistance is the opposite of support.”
Such price points exist in markets for a variety of reasons, one key reason being the
presence of clustered resting orders in the market. Resting orders are instructions left with
a financial institution to execute an order for a client only when the price arrives at a pre-
specified level. For a buy order, if this rate is lower than the prevailing rate then the order
is a take profit, whereas if it is higher than the prevailing rate the order is a stop loss. Such
orders are the standard way in which to open a new position or close an existing position
at a certain price, especially for systematic strategies such as trend following strategies. In
an empirical analysis of such orders in the FX market, Osler [Osl01] noted two interesting
phenomena whilst investigating why trading strategies that depend on price level breakouts
are persistently profitable. Firstly, there are significant differences in the clustering patterns
of stop loss orders compared to take profit orders. Stop loss orders tended to spread more
than take profit order, which cluster strongly. Second, the clustering locations of take profit
orders were strongly linked to round numbers in the asset price, while stop loss orders tended
to be clustered just above round numbers for buy stops, and just below round numbers for
sell stops.
These two observations provide important motivation for our model. The empirical
existence of support and resistance levels provides a general justification for the model we
study. The observation that their origin is in clustered resting orders also suggest that a
good model for support and resistance would involve impulses in the price dynamics, rather
than an alternative such as a price dependent drift function, since the underlying source of
the phenomenon is itself a cluster of single impulses, namely resting orders.
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1.2 The Skew Diffusion Process
To model the phenomenon of support and resistance levels within an asset price process,
we introduce the skew diffusion process that satisfies the SDE












where β1, . . . , βn ∈ (−1, 1) are constants and z1, . . . , zn are distinct points. The SDE (3.1)
contains n symmetric local times of S, each of which is defined by







The local times embedded into the process dynamics mean that the process exhibits a
singular deviation at each of the levels zj , and consequently the process exhibits support or
resistance at those levels depending on the sign of βj .
Remark 15. The intuitive meaning of this property is made clear by following an argument
close to that of Harrison and Shepp [HS81]. Let Y with Y0 = 0 be a reflected Brownian
motion and define Jn as the interval (s, t) in which Y makes its nth excursion away from
zero. Next associate with each Jn an independent Bernoulli random variable en with P[en =
1] = 1+β2 and P[en = −1] = 1−β2 , then the process X defined by
Xt = enYt, for t ∈ Jn
is a skew Brownian motion.
1.3 Merton’s Portfolio Problem
In his classic 1969 paper, Merton proposed a model in which an agent attempts to strike
a balance between the conflicting incentives of present consumption, investment towards
future consumption and a terminal time bequest. His work, which has influenced many
extensions of this concept including this one, provided explicit solutions to the continuous-
time problem with using power law utility functions.
It is assumed that the agent starts with an initial endowment X0 = x > 0 and can
transfer his holdings, continuously and without incurring transaction costs, between the
risky asset S and a risk free asset B. Denote the proportion of wealth held by the agent
in the risky asset by pi and the rate of consumption of wealth by c. Denoting the agent’s














dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt, S0 > 0,
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and
dBt = rBtdt, B0 = 1,





















(α− 1)e−α(T−t) + 1
for a certain constant α. Specifically, pi is a constant and c is a time dependent function
that does not depend on the current risky asset price or level of wealth.
2 The Market Model and Control Problem
Fix a probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) supporting a standard one-dimensional (Ft)-Brownian
motion W . The system we study comprises three stochastic processes S, X and B which
represent the state processes of the control problem, plus a further two stochastic processes
pi and c which are the agent’s controls. The price process of the risky asset S is such that
St is the prevailing market price of the risky asset at time t at which the agent can buy or
sell. We model the price of the risky asset by the skew geometric Brownian motion
dSt = µStdt+ βdL
z
t (S) + σStdWt, S0 = s > 0, (3.4)
where µ and σ > 0 are constants and Lz(S) is the symmetric local time of S at level z. Here
β > 0 corresponds to a support level whilst β < 0 corresponds to resistance. The following
assumption ensures that the SDE has a unique strong solution.
Assumption 9. The constant β in (3.4) is such that β ∈ (−1, 1).
The process B represents the price of a risk free asset, accruing interest at a constant
rate r, the price of which is given by
dBt = rBtdt, B0 = 1. (3.5)
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As we have discussed, the general dynamics of the wealth process X are given by (3.3).
















We assume that the agent’s utility from both consumption and bequest is given by the





for x > 0.
Assumption 10. γ ∈ (0, 1).
We also set the agent’s rate of subjective exponential discounting ρ ≥ 0 to be a constant.
This is understood to specify the agent’s time preference, as opposed to r which represents
the rate of return of cash not invested in the risky asset, and we shall see that these two
rates play different roles in the solution.
2.1 Arbitrage Considerations
It is tempting to consider strategies in the class introduced by the following definition.
Definition 5. The family of all admissible portfolio-consumption pairs (c, pi) consists of all
bounded (Ft)-progressively measurable processes c and pi.
However, this class includes strategies that realise arbitrage as the following result shows.
Theorem 12. A market as described in (3.4)–(3.6) admits arbitrage.
Proof. Take an agent with initial wealth x = 1 who follows the very simple admissible
strategy pit =
|β|
β 1{St=z}. In other words, the agent invests Xt or −Xt in the risky asset
whenever St = z, where the sign of the investment is equal to the sign of β, and invests 0
in the risky asset at all other times. Without loss of generality assume that r = 0 so that





because Lz(S) increases on the set {St = z}. Since Lz(S) is an increasing process, we can
state the conditions for a classical arbitrage opportunity have been met, slightly altered to
fit the context of portfolio management in our context. Specifically,
P(Xt ≥ 1) = 1
and
P(Xt > 1) > 0.
CHAPTER 3. SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE 86
In light of Theorem 12, we see that the skew geometric Brownian motion allows for
a special type of arbitrage opportunity that involves creating an arbitrary spike in the
portfolio holdings of the risky asset at the level z in order to benefit from the directional
effect of the local time. It is therefore the case that the value function of the control problem
is infinite.
The type of arbitrage opportunity arising at the level z is valid in the sense that indicator
functions like 1{St=z} are measurable. However they are not economically realistic or of
particular interest to model. Were such strategies, which require opening and closing large
positions at the level z, practically feasible then they would be the exclusive domain of
professional high frequency arbitrageurs. Our model seeks to understand the impact that
the presence of such support and resistance levels has on overall investment and consumption
across the entire problem space, rather than the specific behaviour that the singularity might
provoke the instant the level is broken.
We therefore propose an additional restriction on the portfolio process pi, in order to
exclude these specific arbitrage strategies from the market. In particular we require a type
of ”smoothness” around the level z, so that the agent may plan their portfolio holdings
immediately above and below the level. These two positions may be distinct, so the portfolio
process may experience a jump. However when the price is exactly at the level the position
must be the average of these two positions.
Definition 6. The family A of all admissible portfolio-consumption pairs (c, pi) consists of
all (Ft)-progressively measurable processes c and pi such that
0 ≤ ct and 0 ≤ ct + |pit| ≤ C for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s.,
for some constant C > 0, which may depend on (c, pi), and
pit = pi(t, St, Xt) for all t ≥ 0,
where pi : R+ × R∗+ × R∗+ → R is a measurable la`dla`g function that satisfies
pi(t, z, x) =
1
2
(pi(t, z−, x) + pi(t, z+, x))
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∗+.
Remark 16. An alternative approach would be to model the phenomenon of support and
resistance levels using a price process with drift that is absolutely continuous with respect
to time. Doing so would ensure the existence of an equivalent martingale measure and
therefore would not allow for the arbitrage we saw in Theorem 12. For example, we might








ln(1 + β)1[z−ε,z] − ln(1− β)1[z,z+ε]
)]
dt+ σ(Sεt )dWt.
Here ε represents the intensity of the level, and smaller ε corresponds to both a smaller
area of impact and a greater jump in the size of the drift. We may say that ε is related to
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the minimum price increment, namely, a tick, on the market in question, since markets that
allow orders to be left with extremely high precision thereby allow market participants to
cluster their orders extremely close to the level z. We also notice that as ε→ 0 the process
converges to the skew diffusion process considered in Section 1.2, a fact that can be seen
by comparing the speed and scale measures of both processes.
We expect that by solving the control problem with this process in place of (3.4) which
should be straightforward since it is a one dimensional Itoˆ diffusion process and the general
case has been studied comprehensively in Karatzas and Shreve [KS98], we would be able
to present our model as the limiting case of this model, as ε → 0. However we did not
complete this work in time to include it in the thesis.
2.2 The Control Problem for T <∞










∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (3.8)
over all admissible controls (c, pi). The value function of the portfolio optimisation problem
is defined by
v(T, s, x) = sup
(c,pi)∈A
JT,s,x(c, pi)
for s, x > 0. We expect that the value function v of the stochastic control problem identifies
with a function w : [0, T ]× R∗+ × R∗+ → R satisfying the non-linear PDE
wt(t, s, x) + sup
(c,pi)∈R+×R
[





inside CT ∪ DT , where
CT = {(t, s, x) ∈ (0, T )× R∗+ × R∗+ | s > z}, (3.10)
DT = {(t, s, x) ∈ (0, T )× R∗+ × R∗+ | s < z}, (3.11)
with terminal condition




and subject to the boundary condition
β
z
xpiwx(t, z, x) +
(
(1 + β)ws(t, z+, x)− (1− β)ws(t, z−, x)
)
= 0 (3.13)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∗+. The differential operator Lc,pi is defined by
Lc,piw(t, s, x) = 1
2
σ2pi2x2wxx(t, s, x) + σ




+ ((µ− r)pi + (r − c))xwx(t, s, x) + µsws(t, s, x)− ρw(t, s, x) (3.14)
for (c, pi) ∈ R+ × R and for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∗+ × R∗+.
CHAPTER 3. SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE 88
2.3 The Control Problem for T =∞








∣∣∣ S0 = s,X0 = x] (3.15)
over all admissible controls (c, pi). In this case, we restrict attention to the following class
of controls.
Definition 7. Given a discounting rate ρ > 0, the family of consumption-portfolio pairs Ap









The value function associated with the control problem on the infinite time horizon is defined
by
v(s, x) = sup
(c,pi)∈Ap
J∞,s,x(c, pi)
for s ∈ R∗+ and x ∈ R∗+. We opt to repeat the usage of v to represent the value function on
the infinite horizon, as the context will ensure there is no ambiguity.
Again, we expect that the value function v of the stochastic control problem on the










for (s, x) ∈ C ∪ D, where
C = {(s, x) ∈ R∗+ × R∗+ | s > z}, (3.18)
D = {(s, x) ∈ R∗+ × R∗+ | s < z}, (3.19)





(1 + β)ws(z+, x)− (1− β)ws(z−, x)
)
= 0
for all x ∈ R∗+. Here the differential operator Lc,pi is defined as in (3.14).
3 Verification Theorems
We now prove two verification theorems for the control problem described in Section 2, first
for the finite time horizon and then for the infinite horizon.
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Theorem 13 (Finite Time Horizon: T <∞). Let w : [0, T ]×R∗+×R∗+ → R be a continuous
function that is C1,2,2 in CT ∪ DT , defined by (3.10) and (3.11), and satisfies the HJB
equation (3.9) and (3.12) as well as the polynomial growth condition
|ws(t, s, x)|+ |wx(t, s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (3.20)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∗+ × R∗+ for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(0, s, x) ≥ v(T, s, x) (3.21)
for all s, x > 0. Furthermore, suppose that there exist measurable functions cˆ : [0, T ]×R∗+×
R∗+ → R+ and pˆi : [0, T ]× R∗+ × R∗+ → R such that
wt(t, s, x) + Lcˆ(t,s,x),pˆi(t,s,x)w(t, s, x) + x
γ cˆγ(t, s, x)
γ
= wt(t, s, x) + sup
(c,pi)∈R+×R
[





for all (t, s, x) ∈ CT ∪ DT , and
β
z
xpˆi(t, z, x)wx(t, z, x) + ((1 + β)ws(t, z+, x)− (1− β)ws(t, z−, x)) = 0 (3.23)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R∗+. Also, suppose that the controlled diffusion
dXt =
[








t (S) + σpˆi(t, St, Xt)XtdWt
admits unique strong solution, and
cˆt = cˆ(t, St, Xt)
and
pˆit = pˆi(t, St, Xt)
define processes such that (cˆ, pˆi) ∈ A. Then (cˆ, pˆi) is an optimal consumption-portfolio pair
and
w(0, s, x) = v(T, s, x) (3.24)
for all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∗+ × R∗+.






















































































where C > 0 is a constant such that |pit| ≤ C for all t ≥ 0 (see Definition 6). Novikov’s

















<∞, for all t ≥ 0








<∞ for all k ≥ 1. (3.27)
Using the symmetric version of the Itoˆ Tanaka formula established in Peskir [Pes07]













































(ws(u, Su+, Xu)− ws(u, Su−, Xu))1{Su=z}dLzt (S).
(3.28)
Using the fact that the Lebesgue measure of {u ∈ [0, t]|Su = z} is zero, P-a.s., we can see




(wt(u, z+, Xu) + wt(u, z−, Xu))1{Su=z}du = 0.
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It follows that (3.28) reduces to
w(t, St, Xt) = w(0, s, x) +
∫ t
0










































(ws(u, z+, Xu)− ws(u, z−, Xu))1{Su=z}dLzt (S).
(3.29)
Applying Itoˆ’s integration by parts formula and substituting in (3.4) and (3.6) we obtain













Xtpit(wx(t, z−, Xt) + wx(t, z+, Xt))








e−ρu (σpiuXuwx(u, Su, Xu) + σSuws(u, Su, Xu))1{Su 6=z}dWu. (3.31)
Using Itoˆ’s isometry, the growth condition on ws and wx given in (3.20), the boundedness
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where k¯ ∈ N and C > 0 are appropriate constants. Therefore M is a square integrable














E [|Xt|γ ]T <∞. (3.33)







≥ wt(t, St, Xt) + Lct,pitw(t, St, Xt). (3.34)
By substituting (3.34), the terminal condition (3.12) and the boundary condition (3.13) at
s = z into (3.30) and taking expectations, we obtain










≤ w(0, S0, X0) (3.35)
which establishes (3.21) because (c, pi) ∈ A has been arbitrary.
If we take (cˆ, pˆi) ∈ A in place of (c, pi), then (3.34) holds with equality and










= w(0, S0, X0).
Together with (3.21), this identity results in (3.24) as well as the optimality of (cˆ, pˆi).
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Theorem 14 (Infinite Time Horizon: T = ∞). Let w : R∗+ × R∗+ → R be a continuous
function that is C2,2 in C ∪D, defined by (3.18) and (3.19), and satisfies the HJB equation
(3.17) as well as the polynomial growth conditions
|w(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|γ) (3.36)
and
|ws(s, x)|+ |wx(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + |s|k + |x|k) (3.37)
for all (s, x) ∈ R∗+ × R∗+ for some constants k ∈ N and C > 0. Then
w(s, x) ≥ v(s, x) (3.38)
for all s, x > 0. Furthermore, suppose that there exists measurable functions cˆ : R∗+×R∗+ →
R+ and pˆi : R∗+ × R∗+ → R such that
Lcˆ(t,s,x),pˆi(t,s,x)w(t, s, x) + x










for all (s, x) ∈ C ∪ D, and
β
z
xpˆi(t, z, x)wx(z, x) + ((1 + β)ws(z+, x)− (1− β)ws(z−, x)) = 0 (3.40)
for all x > 0. Also, suppose that the controlled diffusion
dXt =
[








t (S) + σpˆi(St, Xt)XtdWt
admits a unique strong solution, and
cˆt = cˆ(St, Xt)
and
pˆit = pˆi(St, Xt)
define processes such that (cˆ, pˆi) ∈ Ap. Then (cˆ, pˆi) is an optimal consumption-portfolio pair
and
w(s, x) = v(s, x) (3.41)
for all (s, x) ∈ R∗+ × R∗+.
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Proof. Fix any admissible pair of controls (c, pi) ∈ Ap. Applying Itoˆ’s formula and the
integration by parts formula we obtain













Xtpit(wx(z−, Xt) + wx(z+, Xt))








e−ρt (σpitXtwx(St, Xt) + σStws(St, Xt))1{St 6=z}dWt. (3.43)
Arguing as in (3.32), we can see that M is a square integrable martingale. Furthermore,







≥ Lct,pitw(t, St, Xt). (3.44)
Recalling (3.27), we substitute (3.44) and the boundary condition (3.40) at s = z into (3.42)












e−ρTw(ST , XT )
] ≤ w(S0, X0).
Using the monotone convergence theorem and (3.16) in Definition 7, we obtain









≤ w(0, S0, X0).
It follows that (3.38) holds because (c, pi) ∈ Ap has been arbitrary.
It is then clear that if we take (cˆ, pˆi) ∈ Ap in place of (c, pi), then (3.44) holds with
equality and









= w(0, S0, X0).
Together with (3.38), this identity results in (3.41) as well as the optimality of (cˆ, pˆi).
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4 The Solution to the Portfolio Problem over a Finite Time
Horizon T <∞
We now consider the problem of maximising the objective (3.8) over all admissible controls
(c, pi) ∈ A subject to the stochastic dynamics given by (3.4) and (3.5). For easier reference,
recall the HJB equation (3.9), (3.12) and (3.13) for the finite horizon problem
wt(t, s, x) +
1
2
σ2pi2x2wxx(t, s, x) + σ













and subject to the boundary condition
β
z
xpi(wx(t, z−, x) + wx(t, z+, x))
+ ((1 + β)ws(t, z−, x)− (1− β)ws(t, z−, x)) = 0. (3.47)
Inside the set CT ∪ DT the controls pi and c that achieve the maximum in (3.45) are given
by














x (t, s, x)
x
. (3.49)
Substituting pˆi and cˆ back into (3.45), we obtain






















x (t, s, x)
+ rxwx(t, s, x) + µsws(t, s, x)− ρw(t, s, x) = 0. (3.50)
Substituting the expression
























h(t, s) + 1 = 0 (3.52)
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with terminal condition
h(T, s) = 1. (3.53)
To deal with the boundary condition (3.47), we note that if w is of the special form
given by (3.51), then taking derivatives with respect to x above and below z we get
wx(t, z−, x) + wx(t, z+, x) = xγ−1
(
h1−γ(t, z−) + h1−γ(t, z+))
= 2xγ−1h1−γ(t, z) (3.54)
by the continuity of h which follows from the continuity of w. Applying the transformation
(3.51) to the first order conditions for pˆi and cˆ given by (3.48) and (3.49), we see that they
also admit simpler representations in terms of h, specifically








for s 6= z, and




In particular pˆi and cˆ are not dependent on x. Notice that the boundary condition (3.47)
also contains a term involving pi. As discussed in Section 2.1 the potential for arbitrage
opportunities for certain choices of pi at s = z led to the inclusion of an additional restriction
in Definition 6 which allows us to write








(hs(t, z−) + hs(t, z+))
h(t, z)
. (3.57)
Substituting (3.54) and (3.57) into the original boundary condition (3.47) we arrive at a























(1− γ)2 . (3.59)
The PDE (3.52) with terminal condition (3.53) can be transformed to the heat equation
using the transformation
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κ = −
µ−r
1−γ + r − 12σ2
σ2
, (3.62)
τ = T − t (3.63)
and
ζ = log s. (3.64)
Here, we reverse time and consider log prices ζ instead of absolute prices s, namely (3.63)–
(3.64). In particular, we can see that u must satisfy the heat equation given by
uτ (τ, ζ) = Σuζζ(τ, ζ), (3.65)
where Σ = 12σ
2, with initial condition


























uζ(t, z¯−) = 0, (3.67)
where z¯ = log z.
We now prove two lemmas which will be needed to solve (3.65)–(3.67). The boundary
condition (3.67) prevents a simple direct solution, and so we apply a Laplace transform to
the problem. In Lemma 4 we present the solution to the resulting ODE, to which we must
then apply an inverse Laplace transform to recover the solution to the original problem,
which we do in Lemma 5.
Our results involve the error function Erf(.) and the complementary error function










Erfc(z) = 1− Erf(z)
for z ∈ R.
Lemma 4. Consider the ordinary differential equation
p u˜(p, ζ)− e−κζ = Σ u˜ζζ(p, ζ) (3.68)































u˜ζ(p, z¯−) = 0 (3.69)




u˜−(p, ζ), ζ ≤ z¯,
u˜+(p, ζ), ζ > z¯.
(3.70)
then u˜ is continuous, u˜− (respectively, u˜+) satisfies the ordinary differential equation (3.68)
in (−∞, z¯) (respectively, (z¯,∞)) and (3.69) holds. This function admits the expressions
u˜−(p, ζ) =
e−κζ





































 e− (ζ−z¯)√Σ √p.
(3.72)
















































Substituting (3.74), (3.75) and the boundary condition (3.76) into (3.73) and solving for
A(p) and B(p) gives,
A(p) = −e−κz¯ p−
(
α+ κ2Σ− 1)(
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and
B(p) = −e−κz¯ p−
(
α+ κ2Σ− 1)(













and (3.74) and (3.75) identify with (3.71) and (3.72).

















c2 − c3 fc2(τ, ζ)−
c3 − c1










































Proof. If g(τ) is the inverse Laplace transform of gˆ(τ), then the inverse Laplace transform
of g˜(
√













Also note that the inverse Laplace transform of
eap
1 + bp






where H(a + τ) represents the Heaviside function. Combining these two observations we





































































Next we appeal to the Laplace convolution theorem which states that given the inverse
transforms for two functions f˜ and g˜ calculated individually as f and g, the inverse transform
of the product is given by the convolution∫ τ
0
f(u)g(τ − u)du.
If g(τ) is the inverse Laplace transform of g˜(p), then the inverse Laplace transform of
p− c1
(p− c2)(p− c3) g˜(p)
is given by
c2 − c1




e−c2ug(u)du− c3 − c1





















































































We conclude that the inverse Laplace transform of f˜ identifies with (3.79).
We can now prove the main result of this section. The functions Φ1 : R+ × R+ → R,
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Φ2 : R+ × R+ → R and Φ3 : R+ × R+ → R appearing here are defined by
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Theorem 15. Consider the control problem formulated in Section 2.2. Define









































































and suppose that the functions defined by
pˆi±(t, s, x)(t, s, x) = − s
x
v±sx(T − t, s, x)
v±xx(T − t, s, x)
− (µ− r)
σ2
v±x (T − t, s, x)
x v±xx(T − t, s, x)
(3.85)
and
cˆ±(t, s, x) =





are bounded. Then the value function of the control problem takes the form
v(T, s, x) =
{
v−(T, s, x), s ≤ z,
v+(T, s, x), s > z,
(3.87)










































T − t, zs
















(α− 1)e−α(T−t) + 1)+ µαµα+ κ1−γ e−α(T−t)P (T − t, 1)
]
1{St=z} (3.88)


























(α− 1)e−α(T−t) + 1)+ µαµα+ κ1−γ e−α(T−t)P (T − t, 1)
]
1{St=z} (3.89)
Proof. We have established that using a suitable transformation, a function w that solves the
HJB equation (3.9), (3.12) and (3.13) may be transformed into the heat equation with initial
condition and boundary condition at the point z¯ = log z as in (3.65)–(3.67). Taking the
Laplace transform of the differential equation (3.65)–(3.67) yields the ODE and boundary


















c3 = α+ κ
2Σ,
and





the second term in (3.71) corresponds to the function (3.77) in Lemma 5, so its inverse
Laplace transform is given by (3.79). The first term in (3.71) has inverse transform
eκ
2Στ−κζ .
It is then clear that the inverse Laplace transform of u˜− can be written as the sum of these
two solutions, which can be written as







2Στ−κz¯ [φ1(τ, ζ) + φ2(τ, ζ) + φ3(τ, ζ)] ,
where
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in which expressions the constants Υ1 and Υ2 are defined by (3.81) and (3.82).
Next, we reverse the transformation (3.60) from h to u by substituting in our solution










































Finally by reversing the first transformation that we made in (3.51) we are able to
retrieve the value function w in the form
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By following a similar argument we can derive the expression


































It is worth noting that at the boundary s = z we have, the continuity of w provides the
expression















































|Φ3(t, l)| ≤ eα(T−t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Υ2

















for any l ∈ [0, 1]. From these inequalities and from (3.25) and (3.27), it is clear that
(3.83) and (3.84) satisfy the growth condition (3.20). Furthermore, the assumption that
the functions cˆ and pˆi defined by (3.86) and (3.85) are bounded implies that the processes
pˆi and cˆ defined by (3.88) and (3.89) are admissible.
Corollary 3. Away from the boundary z the value function converges to the value function
of the classic Merton portfolio problem.
Proof. This follows immediately from the observation that for constants a and b and any














































(α− 1)e−αT + 1)}1−γ .
Remark 17. Considering the contrapositive of Corollary 3, as the asset price S approaches
the level z the value function, and hence the portfolio process pi and consumption rate c begin
to differ from that of the classic Merton problem. Recall from (3.55) that this difference
depends on the ratio of h and its first derivate in s, specifically hs(.)h(.) . It turns out that
this term, while it can be written in explicit form, is complicated and does not lead to any
useful intuition about the behaviour of the risky asset holdings pi in the solution. We will
therefore defer any detailed analysis of the solution form until we have studied the infinite
horizon case.
5 The Solution to the Portfolio Problem over an Infinite
Time Horizon T =∞
We now consider the problem of maximising the objective (3.15) over all admissible controls
(c, pi) ∈ Ap subject to the stochastic dynamics given by (3.4) and (3.5). For easier reference,
























+ rxwx(s, x) + µsws(s, x)− ρw(s, x) = 0, (3.90)
with boundary condition at the level s = z given by
β
z
xpiu(wx(z−, x) + wx(z+, x))
+ ((1 + β)ws(z−, x)− (1− β)ws(z−, x)) = 0. (3.91)
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h(s) + 1 = 0. (3.93)
At the boundary s = z our solution must satisfy the boundary condition (3.91). Following
the argument made in (3.54), (3.55) and (3.57) with regard to the form of pi at the boundary,















In particular, pˆi and cˆ do not depend on x. By substituting these into the original boundary























(1− γ)2 . (3.97)
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Assumption 11. The model data is such that













) > −1. (3.99)
The following result reveals that, in the absence of conditions such as the ones in this
assumption, the value function may be infinite.
Lemma 6. If (3.98) in Assumption 11 fails, µ > r and β > 0, the value function of the
control problem
v(s, x) =∞.
for all s, x > 0.
Proof. Suppose that the agent starts with initial endowment x at time 0 and sets pi and
c to be constant for all t ∈ [0,∞). In this case the dynamics of the wealth process X are















which admits the solution
Xt = x exp
((







piLzt (S) + σpiWt
)
.
Substituting this expression into the objective function (3.15) we see that




























1− γ ≥ 0






1− γ + rγ − c− ρ > 0
and hence,









(µ− r)pi + r − c− 1
2
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Remark 18. In Lemma 11 we restricted attention to the case β > 0 so as to simplify our
demonstration that the value function may be infinite. We expect that this is also the case
when β < 0 however the local time appearing in the expectation complicates the analysis.
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 16. Consider the control problem with formulated in Section 2.3, and suppose
that Assumption 11 holds. The value function of the control problem admits the expression
v(x, s) =
{
v−(x, s), s ≤ z,



















































































)m1{St>z} + α1 + C 1{St=z} (3.104)
where µα and C > −1 are defined by (3.97) and (3.99).










The continuity of h yields the equation
Azn = Bzm.
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Reversing the transformation by substituting h− and h+ back into (3.92) we see that v+
and v− admit the expressions given by (3.101) and (3.102).
It is immediately clear from (3.101) and (3.102) that the growth conditions (3.36) and
(3.37) are satisfied. Moreover, pˆi−, pˆi+, cˆ− and cˆ+ are bounded and (cˆ, pˆi) ∈ Ap.
We are now able to observe some features of the agent’s optimal control around the level
s = z. Specifically recall that (3.94) and (3.95) imply that the optimal portfolio weight as
































above the level s = z. For the case with β > 0 we can see that the portfolio process pi
becomes greater than the Merton solution µ−r
σ2
1
1−γ below the level, peaking at the level and
then reversing, so that pi is less than the Merton solution above the level.
We can interpret this as the agent adding additional holdings of the risky asset when
below the level in order to take advantage of the potential upward movement in the asset
price that is more likely to occur than not due to the positive β. This effect can be seen
in Figure 3.1. It is an interesting feature of the solution that holdings of the risky asset
will then be reduced to levels lower than that of the standard Merton solution when the














































Figure 3.3: Optimal consumption rate c as a function of the underlying asset price s when
β > 0






Figure 3.4: Optimal consumption rate c as a function of the underlying asset price s when
β < 0
price St is just above the level z. We can see from (3.94) that this is due to those holding
being related to the first derivative of h in s. We can also see that when β < 0 the effect is
reversed, see Figure 3.2.









As the price approaches the level z from below, the portfolio holdings of the agent differ




γ (n−m)− βγ (n+m)
,
and on the other hand, as the price approaches the level z from above, the portfolio holdings




γ (n−m)− βγ (n+m)
.
It is also easy to see that for β = 0 the jump in the portfolio process pi and in the
first derivate of c at z disappear and the problem reduces to the classic Merton problem as
expected. Another interesting observation is that as β approaches 1, the size of the jump in
the portfolio process pi at z remains finite, despite the consideration made in Remark 15 that
under these conditions the level at z acts like an impermeable barrier. Of course we cannot
claim anything about the behaviour of the problem at β = 1 because strong solutions to
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This calculation reveals that the finite jump size is related to the risk aversion of the agent,
and see that as γ → 1 the jump size goes to ∞.
Finally, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show that the consumptionrate c as a function of the
price s. Around the level s = z this rate of consumption, being inversely proportional to
the function h, decreases if β > 0 and increases if β > 0. Intuitively this inverse relationship
with the value function is expected, since when the agent is able to derive excess value from
the presence of the level in the market he should consume less quickly in order to invest
more in the risky asset, and vice versa.
Corollary 4. As T →∞, the value function of the finite horizon problem converges to the
value function of the infinite horizon problem





































































































































































which identify with the expressions for the value function v in the infinite horizon case.
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